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ABSTRACT  
  
This dissertation integrates research on boards of directors with human 
and social capital perspectives to examine board appointments. A director's 
appointment to a board is in part due to the belief that the individual can 
contribute critical resources and monitoring to the organization. The ability of a 
director to provide these resources and monitoring depends on his or her level of 
human and social capital. This dissertation more fully integrates human and social 
capital perspectives into our understanding of board appointment events.  
From these theoretical underpinnings, a model is developed proposing that 
several human and social capital indicators, including educational level, expertise, 
director experience, and access to network structural holes, affect the likelihood 
of joining a new board, joining a prestigious board, and exiting a current board. I 
also consider a number of contextual- and individual-level variables that may 
potentially moderate the relationship between a director's human and social 
capital and director mobility.  
Through this dissertation, I make a number of contributions to the 
literatures on boards, board appointments, and human and social capital. First, I 
offer a more comprehensive perspective of the board appointment process by 
developing an individual-level perspective of board appointments. Second, I 
contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the market for corporate 
directors. Third, I focus on several salient dimensions of director mobility. Fourth, 
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I contribute to the growing literature on human and social capital at the board and 
director levels. Finally, I add to the growing literature on director selection. 
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Understanding the determinants of board composition has long been a 
central focus of corporate governance research (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & 
Cannella, 2009; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988). This central focus on director 
selection derives from the critical functions that boards carry out for organizations 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Johnson, Ellstrand, & Daily, 1996; Zahra & Pearce, 
1989). While a number of board functions are discussed, Hillman and Dalziel 
(2003) integrate and consolidate these into two distinct functions. First, building 
upon an agency theory perspective, boards of directors serve a monitoring 
function that helps ensure the alignment of management and shareholder interests 
(Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Second, following the resource dependence 
perspective, boards of directors also provide a resource provision function 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Those directors that are more capable of carrying out 
these distinction functions should be able to better affect board and overall 
organizational performance.  
These critical board functions have led to a vast amount research 
considering how and why certain individuals are appointed to boards of directors. 
For example, research considers a variety of organizational and external changes 
that in part determine the types of directors that are selected to compose the board 
(Finkelstein et al., 2009; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). These include such 
organizational considerations as firm performance, strategy, and life cycle stage 
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(Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Similarly, research also considers 
a variety of external factors such as environmental uncertainty and changes in the 
external environment (e.g., industry regulation) that may affect director selection 
and board composition. This research offers a number of key insights into both 
the organizational- and environmental-level determinants of director selection and 
board composition.  
While this extant research offers a number of key insights into 
understanding board composition, it has done so often neglecting the individual-
level characteristics of the potential director. Research is only beginning to 
consider a variety of individual-level determinants that affect direct selection. 
These studies consider a variety of factors, such as director stigmatization 
(Gilson, 1990; Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann, & Hambrick, 2008), impression 
management skills (Westphal & Stern, 2006, 2007), and the ability to provide 
resources to the organization (Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007).  
However, even this individual-level research often fails to directly 
consider the role that human and social capital plays in determining director 
selection (for an exception see Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Cannella, 2008). A 
director’s human and social capital directly relates to the individual’s ability to 
carry out the board functions of monitoring and resource provision (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003), and in turn should determine whether an individual is initially 
appointed to a board of directors and, of interest here, join subsequent boards1
                                                 
1 Because of my focus on current corporate directors, I will examine appointments 
that follow the director’s current board appointments. Therefore, in discussing the 
. 
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Those directors with higher levels of human and social capital should be better 
able to provide monitoring and resources to the board and firm. Thus, those 
directors with higher levels of human and social capital should be more valuable 
in the market for corporate directors and should receive more board appointments. 
However, research is yet to formally articulate or empirically examine the 
underpinning of this critical relationship and the subsequent appointment 
consequences of director human and social capital.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to delve into the individual-level 
determinants of why current corporate directors receive subsequent board 
appointments and to develop an individual-level theory of director mobility for 
current corporate directors. I also consider a number of individual and contextual 
variables that may influence the relationship between a director’s human and 
social capital and director mobility. I address the following research questions:  
What is the relationship between director-level human and social capital 
and director mobility? And, what individual and contextual variables 
moderate the relationship between director human and social capital and 
director mobility? 
Through these research questions, I offer a more comprehensive conceptualization 
of why certain directors are more likely to receive future board appointments 
while others do not.  
I also move beyond solely examining the likelihood of subsequent 
appointments and delineate several important dimensions of the board 
                                                                                                                                     
board appointment process, I will refer to the appointments as subsequent board 
appointments.  
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appointment outcome. Prior research considering director selection often only 
focuses on the likelihood of receiving a new board appointment. However, this 
only captures one dimension of the appointment process. Other salient dimensions 
remain underdeveloped and under-theorized; yet, these dimensions inherently 
may be important in firm’s ability to gain benefits from a director’s appointments. 
Namely, I examine three dimensions: 1) the likelihood of joining a new board, 2) 
the likelihood of joining a prestigious board, and 3) the likelihood of exiting a 
current board.  
Utilizing the human and social capital perspectives of job mobility 
(Becker, 1964; Coleman, 1991), I argue that a director’s human and social capital 
should directly relate to his or her likelihood of joining a new board, with those 
directors with higher levels of human and social capital more likely to join new 
and more prestigious boards. Further following research on individual-level 
turnover using human and social capital (e.g., Dess & Shaw, 2001; Jovanovic, 
1979), I argue that higher levels of human and social capital should also directly 
relate to a higher likelihood of director exit as these individuals have more 
opportunities for mobility. While this prediction may seem counterintuitive, it 
follows previous research on job mobility (e.g., Acemoglu & Pischke, 1998; 
1999; Jovanovic, 1979) and reflects the complexity of examining mobility at the 
individual level (Dess & Shaw, 2001).   
 
Contribution 
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 Through this dissertation, I make a number of contributions to the 
corporate governance and board of directors literatures. First, through my 
theoretical model, I develop an individual-level perspective of the board 
appointment process by focusing on the human and social capital determinants of 
subsequent board appointments. While previous research offers a number of 
insights by focusing on the organizational, board, and environmental factors, 
these determinants are only partially able to explain why certain individuals are 
selected for board appointments because they do not provide information on the 
individual-level drivers from the potential director’s perspective. By considering 
the individual-level characteristics of human and social capital, I contribute a 
complementary perspective of director selection that provides a more 
comprehensive understanding of director selection.  
 Second, I offer insights into the market for corporate directors both 
through my theoretical model and its empirical testing. The market for corporate 
directors has long been an important consideration in understanding current and 
potential directors’ motivations for performing board functions and to understand 
the mechanism by which directors that do not perform these functions are 
punished (Fama, 1980). However, very little research moves beyond Fama’s 
initial premise that directors who are unable to perform will face “settling up” or 
the inability to attain new appointments. Here, I consider how the market operates 
for potential directors in a more detailed fashion and examine what director 
characteristics are deemed valuable and rare in this market. By examining a 
director’s level of human and social capital and its effects on subsequent 
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appointments, my model offer key insights into the valuation process that occurs 
within the market for corporate directors.  
Third, as previously mentioned, I also further delineate and develop 
several salient dimensions of a director’s board appointment. The first dimension, 
the likelihood of new board appointments, captures the probability that a director 
will receive subsequent board appointments. Research posits that directors with 
higher human and social capital should be more likely to receive board 
appointments (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Lester et al., 2008); however, the 
direct relationship between a director’s human and social capital and his or her 
likelihood of receiving future board appointments is yet to be explicitly tested. 
The second dimension, likelihood of joining more prestigious appointments, may 
offer new insights into a director’s motivation to continue to garner high-status 
appoints relative to the individual’s willingness to sit on lower status boards to 
contribute to the legitimacy needs of the firm. Finally, the likelihood of board exit 
is critical because it reflects another under-developed aspect of director mobility 
on the market for corporate directors. Director exit from a board may be because 
of a variety of reasons. For example, the firm may have been able to gain and 
appropriate the benefits of directors’ human and social capital and no longer 
needs the director to physical sit on the firm’s board. The firm may have also 
found a substitute for the director’s human and social he or she provided to the 
board. Or, the director may have reached the board’s mandatory retirement age set 
for all directors serving on the particular board. Conversely, rather than prompted 
by the firm, a director may voluntarily exit a board either in the desire to move 
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onto to a new board without becoming overboarded in the process, and thus, the 
individual exits one of his or her current board seats in order to enter a new board, 
or to simply end his or her tenure as a corporate director.  
Fourth, I contribute to the growing body of research on the human and 
social capital of those in the upper echelons of organizations. In particular, 
through this dissertation, I offer a more dynamic perspective of the role of human 
and social capital in board appointments. An active stream of research examines 
the influence of directors’ human and social capital on board and organizational 
performance. However, this research often focuses on the stock of director capital 
rather than the change in this capital that can occur over time or after specific 
events. In this vein, research considers director characteristics such as education 
level (Boivie, Jones, & Khanna, 2008; Westphal & Milton, 2000), previous 
corporate experience (Walters, Kroll, & Wright, 2008), and firm tenure 
(Rutherford & Buchholtz, 2007) that represent directors’ human capital. Research 
also examines directors’ network ties and the quality of these ties (Carpenter & 
Westphal, 2001; Stevenson & Radin, 2009), which represent their social capital. 
However, much of this research assumes that directors bring these different forms 
of director capital to a board without considering if and how the forms of capital 
change. In this study, I follow a sample of directors over a 10-year period and 
examine their changes in director experience and social capital. In this regard, this 
study captures a more dynamic perspective of how director’s human and social 
capital may change over time. To further consider the dynamic change of human 
and social capital, I consider several individual-level and contextual variables, 
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including gender, a director’s exit from a board in the previous period, director 
stigmatization from financial restatements, and the industry conditions in which 
the director serves to provide a more dynamic perspective of a director’s human 
and social capital.  
Finally, this dissertation adds to the growing literature on director 
selection. As Finkelstein and colleagues (2009) point out, relative to the research 
on CEO turnover and selection, fewer studies consider director turnover and 
selection. This is an important theoretical consideration missing from the 
literature on boards of directors. While research has developed a fairly well 
informed understanding of why certain individuals may be selected for the role of 
CEO at a particular firm, we have yet to delve into why certain individuals obtain 
board appointments.  
 
Dissertation Outline 
This dissertation is organized as follows. In chapter 2, I review the 
theoretical literature underpinning my research model and proposed hypotheses. I 
first examine the basic tenets of agency and resource dependence theories and 
describe the board functions of monitoring and resource provisioning. I then 
review the human and social capital literatures and how extant managerial and 
board research applies these concepts. Finally, I conclude this chapter by 
reviewing the board literature on board composition and director selection.  
In Chapter 3, I develop a theoretical model of the relationship between a 
director’s human and social capital and director mobility. In doing so, I delineate 
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several salient dimension of director selection and how human and social capital 
affects these different dimensions. Furthermore, I theorize the moderating effects 
of a number of individual and contextual variables on the relationship between 
human and social capital and director mobility. 
In Chapter 4, I describe my methodological approach to test my theoretical 
model developed in Chapter 3. In particular, I describe my sampling technique, 
operational measures for my theoretical constructs, and the statistical analyses 
that I use to test the hypotheses.  
Chapter 5 presents the results of the hypothesis testing of my research 
model. Finally, in Chapter 6, I provide a discussion of the empirical results, 
limitations, and future research directions from this study. 
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, I offer a review of the relevant theories underlying my 
theoretical model and hypothesized relationships discussed in chapter 3. In doing 
so, I first delineate the monitoring and resource provision functions. Then, I 
define human and social capital and review the research on human and social 
capital in the management and board literatures. Finally, I conclude by reviewing 




 The monitoring function refers to the responsibility of directors to monitor 
the actions of executives on behalf of shareholders. This function derives from 
agency theory, which is concerned with the relationship between principals and 
agents and focuses on how to minimize the agency costs associated with this 
relationship (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976, for a 
review see Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007). From this perspective, the 
organization is viewed as a nexus of contracts in which ownership and 
management are separate (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Agency problems 
occur when one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the 
agent) to perform a service on their behalf that involves delegating some decision-
making authority to the agent (Fama, 1980) and information asymmetry. This 
relationship is problematic because, as Barney and Hesterly (1996: 125) point out, 
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“(1) the interests of principal and agent will typically diverge; (2) the principal 
cannot perfectly and costlessly monitor the actions of the agent; (2) and the 
principal cannot perfectly or costlessly monitor and acquire information available 
to or possessed by the agent.” Because of these problems, a central tenet of 
agency theory is “that there is potential for mischief when the interests of owners 
and those of managers diverge” (Dalton et al., 2007: 2). This opportunity for 
potential mischief creates the agency problem and in turn agency costs. 
 Agency theory is concerned with minimizing the costs associated with 
principal-agent relationship and problems that arise from this separation of 
ownership and management. In doing so, agency theory suggests several 
governance mechanisms that might mitigate the agency problem and in turn affect 
corporate strategy. These governance mechanisms include the influence of 
ownership arrangements, boards of directors, managerial compensation 
arrangements, the market for managerial talent, and the market for corporate 
control (Dalton et al., 2007). However, these mechanisms are not costless. 
Agency costs accrue as the principals attempt to utilize these mechanisms to 
reduce agency problems (Eisenhardt, 1989a).  
 Boards of directors are one mechanism put in place to reduce the agency 
problem. The boards of directors serve a monitoring function that helps ensure the 
alignment of management and shareholder interests (Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra 
& Pearce, 1989). In carrying out this monitoring function, directors may engage 
in a variety of activities including: selecting, evaluating, and replacing executive 
management; serving the interest of shareholders; and assessing and monitoring 
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the firm’s strategic direction and overall performance (Bacon & Brown, 1975; 
Monks & Minow, 2004; Vance, 1983).  
 Much of the research on boards of directors examines boards from the 
agency lens (Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). This research often 
focuses on the role of director/board independence from the executives of the firm 
and suggests that boards should be composed entirely or at least with a majority 
of independent directors. Agency theory suggests a positive relationship between 
board independence and firm performance; however, the results of studies 
examining the link between board independence and firm performance are mixed 
at best (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & 
Ellstrand, 1999). Thus, while the board does serve as a critical governance 
mechanism to reduce the agency problem, other board functions may also be 
critically important.  
Resource Provision Function  
 The board serves the resource provision function by providing a variety of 
resources to the firm. This function derives from resource dependence theory, 
which focuses on the relationship between organizations and their environments 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, for a review see Hillman, Withers & Collins, 2009). 
More specifically, this perspective posits that organizations depend on the 
external environment for scarce resources; however, these organizations attempt 
to acquire control over these resources or reduce other’s power over the resources 
in order to minimize dependence on the external environment (Ulrich & Barney, 
1984).  
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 Organizations may utilize a variety of strategies to reduce this dependence 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). These include engaging in mergers and acquisitions, 
joining joint ventures and other interfirm relationships, utilizing political action, 
replacing current executives. Boards of directors also may be used as a 
dependence reducing mechanism either through cooptation or providing a number 
of resources to the firm. From this perspective, boards of directors are another 
mechanism to minimize dependence or gain control over resources (Pfeffer, 
1972). The board provides several key resources to the organization and top 
management team. More specifically, boards provide (1) advice and counsel, (2) 
legitimacy, (3) channels for communicating information between external 
organizations and the firm, and (4) preferential access to commitments or support 
from important elements outside the firm (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978: 145, 161).   
Considerable research examines the resource provision role of boards 
(Hillman et al., 2009; Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Empirical 
research in this area, for the most part, supports the director’s role in linking the 
focal firm to its environment and providing a number of important resources to 
the firm (e.g., Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Provan, 1980). Additionally, research on board 
composition supports the notion that board composition is changed to adapt to 
environmental changes a focal firm may face (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 
2000; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
 
Human and Social Capital Literatures 
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While interrelated and often empirically indistinguishable, human and 
social capital derive from different theoretical perspectives and build upon 
different theoretical bases (Coleman, 1988b, 1990). Human capital theory is 
rooted in economic theory and often applied in labor economics (Becker, 1964). 
Social capital, on the other hand, derives from sociology as it considers the 
relational aspects from social interaction (Coleman, 1990). While these forms of 
capital are not direct measures of ability, per se, they are highly correlated with an 
individual’s ability and the outcomes of ability and, as such, are critical to 
understanding a director’s ability to monitor and provide resources (Becker, 1964; 
Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Each of these concepts is defined in turn.  
Human Capital 
Human capital refers to the skills, knowledge, expertise, and experiences 
held by an individual (Becker, 1964; Hogan & McPheters, 1980; Schultz, 1961). 
It is created “by changes in persons that bring about skills and capabilities that 
make them able to act in new ways” (Coleman, 1988b: S100). Becker (1964) 
originally conceptualized human capital as a resource within individuals inside of 
firms. These resources are modified by specific investments made by the 
individual and the firm (Wang & Barney, 2006).  
Human capital investments are the "activities that influence future 
monetary and psychic income by increasing the resources in people" (Becker, 
1964: 9). These types of investments improve skills, knowledge, or health, 
thereby increasing future monetary and psychic benefits. Investments in human 
capital include education, on-the-job training, and health care (Schultz, 1961: 8, 
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also see Becker, 1964). Speaking specifically about on-the-job training, Becker 
made a distinction between general and specific training. General training consists 
of the accumulation of knowledge from a broad range of loosely related 
knowledge domains not focused on a specific job or firm. Specific training 
encompasses the accumulation of knowledge from a narrow range of closely 
related knowledge domains focused exclusively on a specific a job and firm. Any 
activity or experience, whether formal or informal, wherein an individual can 
learn new skills and ways of thinking, and where such learning increases the 
individual’s financial or psychic income is, by definition, an accumulation of 
human capital (Becker, 1964).  
Much research in management and organizational studies focuses on the 
human capital possessed by individuals in the upper echelons of the organization, 
including boards of directors. Extending Becker’s original delineation, Castanias 
and Helfat (1991) suggest that within the upper echelon, executives have varying 
levels of human capital as measured by general, industry-specific, and firm 
specific skills. In the case of corporate directors, general skills may include 
experience with executive succession, hostile takeovers, organizational crisis, or 
bankruptcy. Industry-specific expertise may include knowledge of key 
technologies, strategic opportunities, competitive dynamics, industry regulation, 
or relationships with key industry leaders. Firm-specific skills may include those 
pertaining to understanding company culture, navigating the political structure, 
converting firm resources into innovation, and managing the firm’s key 
stakeholders. These forms of skills have different fundamental content and 
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different levels of transferability across various contexts (Castanias & Helfat, 
1991, 2001). “General human capital is the most transferable and least unique, 
and firm-specific human capital is the least transferable and most unique. 
Industry-specific human capital, however, is both transferable and relevant to the 
organizations within a given industry” (Sirmon, Gove, & Hitt, 2008: 921).  
Human capital at the executive level greatly affects a variety of outcomes. 
For example, research considers the role of human capital in determining 
executive compensation (Combs & Skill., 2003). From this perspective, Fisher 
and Govindarajan (1992) find that compensation of business unit managers 
positively relates to a measure of human capital—years of education. Harris and 
Helfat (1997) consider the role of human capital in determining differences in 
CEO compensation levels between internal and external successors. From this 
perspective, “external CEO successors may earn both a risk and a return premium 
relative to internal successors” (Harris & Helfat, 1997: 897). Following Castanias 
and Helfat (1991), the authors distinguish between firm- and non-firm-specific 
human capital and between industry-specific and general human capital. Their 
results indicate that external successors receive a premium in initial non-
contingent compensation relative to internal successors.  
Similarly, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) find that a CEO’s level of 
human capital, as measured by experience in general management, is positively 
related to bonus compensation; although it is unrelated to both total compensation 
and salaries. Additionally, boards of financially risky firms may offer new 
externally-hired CEOs golden parachutes, poison pills, and other antitakeover 
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provisions to compensate them for the risk of utilizing their general and firm-
specific human capital in these firms (Evans & Hefner, 2009; Evans, Pyles, & 
Choo, 2009; Harris, 1990; Knoeber, 1986).  
Social capital 
 Social capital represents the “the sum of actual and potential resources 
embedded within, available through, and derived from, the network of 
relationships possessed by that individual” (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998: 243). 
Social capital “comes about through changes in the relations among persons that 
facilitate action.” (Coleman, 1988b: S100). The social capital perspective 
represents the embedded nature of individuals and their knowledge bases 
(Granovetter, 1985). Social capital is similarly to human and other forms of 
capital. As Coleman (1990: 302) posits, “Like other forms of capital, social 
capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that would 
not be attainable in its absence.” However, unlike human capital, social capital 
does not reside within the individual but rather is embedded in the relationships 
among and between individuals (Coleman, 1988b, 1990; Lin, 2001). From this 
perspective, an individual’s network of relationships represents a key resource for 
the actors in the network. Social capital may take a variety of forms including 
obligations and expectations, information potential, norms and effective 
sanctions, etc. (Coleman, 1990). Any gain in interpersonal or relationship-
building skills and trustworthiness that leads to more and deeper professional 
relationships is, by definition, an accumulation of social capital (Coleman, 1990). 
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Extending these concepts to management, research examines the role of 
social capital in a variety of contexts. In the board literature, research examines 
how social capital directly affects the board’s access to resources (Kim, 2007; 
Kim & Cannella, 2008). Through relationships with members of the corporate 
elite at other firms (most commonly studied through board interlocks), directors 
may learn about strategic opportunities, practices, availability of resources, 
potential pitfalls, and penalties associated with various organizational, 
governance, and financial practices (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Mizruchi, 1996). 
They may enable the firm to gain access to critical financial resources (Mizruchi 
& Stearns, 1988). Social capital extends and augments a given director’s 
resources. 
Director Human and Social Capital 
Research in the board literature recognizes the value of director’s skills, 
expertise, and experiences that they bring to board (Bacon & Brown, 1975; 
Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Vance, 1983). In particular, Fama and Jensen (1983: 
315) posit that “[t]he value of their [directors’] human capital depends primarily 
on their performance as internal decision managers in other organizations. They 
use their directorships to signal to internal and external markets for decision 
agents that (1) they are decision experts, (2) they understand the importance of 
diffuse and separate decision control, and (3) they can work with such decision 
control systems.” Much of social capital research at the director level focuses on 
the density or cohesion of an individual’s network and its impact on the 
individual’s ability to increase his or her status in the network of corporate elites 
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(Davis, 1993; Useem, 1984). In turn, research utilizes director human and social 
capital to examine a variety of important firm and board outcomes. In this section, 
I review three particular outcomes: firm performance, board performance, and 
director selection.  
Table 1 represents an overview of the research in stream.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Firm Performance. As mentioned above, a director’s ability to provide 
critical resources and carry out the other key functions of the position is 
predicated on the individual’s cumulative human and social capital. Research 
examines director accumulation of human and social capital and the impact of a 
director’s human and social capital on board and firm performance. In looking at 
specific outcomes, Walters, Kroll, and Wright (2008) find that board incentives 
and board-level human capital, as measured by acquisition target industry 
experience, along with moderate levels of CEO ownership positively influence 
shareholder returns derived from acquisitions announcements. 
Kim (2007) examines the impact of outside director’s social capital on 
firm valuation using a sample of publicly traded Korean firms. Outside director 
social capital represents the degree to which outside directors have linkages to the 
external environment. Kim finds strong support for the relationship between 
outside director social capital and firm value, while finding no significant 
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relationship between the proportion of outside directors and firm value, Tobin’s 
Q.  
Director Selection. In a study of professional directors—defined as an 
outside director who sits on many boards at the same time—Keys and Li (2005) 
find that after a takeover, professional directors are more likely to receive new 
board appoints than other “nonprofessional” directors. The authors suggest that 
this greater likelihood of new appointments is due in part to the professional 
directors’ valuable and transferable general human capital that offset the 
information processing concerns and other costs that come along with holding 
multiple directorships. These professional directors with higher human capital 
also were associated with above-average performing takeover targets relative to 
those with lower human capital.  
Kim and Cannella (2008) conceptually examine the role of social capital 
in new director selection and subsequent board performance. In developing their 
social capital perspective of director selection, they distinguish between internal 
social capital—ties within the focal organization and in particular within the 
board—and external social capital—ties external to the focal organization. They 
posit that both forms of social capital are positively related to director selection on 
a specific board; although, each represents different causal logics for the new 
director appointment. The authors suggest a number of contextual variables that 
may strength the relationship between director internal and external social capital 
and director selection.  
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Utilizing a resource dependence lens, Singh (2007) investigates the ethnic 
diversity on corporate boards in the FTSE 100. Ethnic minority directors were 
likely to hive high levels of human and social capital that allow them to provide a 
number of critical resources to the board and firm. Singh finds that companies 
with ethnic minority directors were significantly different from the FTSE 100 
companies without any ethnic diversity on a variety of dimensions, including 
board size, proportion of outsiders, gender diversity, market capitalization, and 
transparency of new director appointments.  
Similarly, Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Cannella (2008) examine the 
indistinguishable role that human and social capital plays in determining the 
appointment of former government officials as outside directors. These authors 
suggest that the breadth and depth of human and social capital directly affects the 
likelihood that a government official will be appointed as an outside director of a 
firm.  
Board Performance. Nicholson, Alexander, and Kiel (2004) extend the 
resource dependence perspective of boards to define the social capital of boards. 
Utilizing social network analysis, the authors examine the structural social capital 
created from board interlocks within a national corporate governance system. 
Comparing the United States and Australian directorate networks, Nicholson and 
colleagues find that the Australian network is only marginally less compact and 
connected than the US network; although, at the director level the US network is 
larger and more connected than the Australian network.  
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Harris and Helfat (2007) suggest examining the board as a social network 
in-and-of itself. Building from the perspective that boards are groups (Finkelstein 
& Mooney, 2003), the authors apply social capital and network perspectives to 
board decision-making processes. From the perspective of the board as its own 
network, each director holds ties/relationships to the other directors on the board. 
This perspective complements previous research that examines the external ties of 
boards.  
In a study using a multi-method approach of quantitative and qualitative 
analysis, Stevenson and Radin (2009) examine the comparative impact of human 
and social capital on director influence on a board. The authors find “that the 
social capital of board members in the form of ties to others on the board is a 
much stronger factor in gaining influence on the board as compared to the human 
capital of board members such as management experience or committee 
memberships or the social capital of members in terms of ties across boards” 
(Stevenson & Radin, 2009: 17-18). In this case, ties to other directors on the 
board, membership in cliques within the board, and prior relationships with other 
directors represent the greatest predictors of director influence.  
Research recognizes the interdependence and interrelatedness of social 
and human capital (Coleman, 1988b). Social relationships are sources of 
information that individuals can accumulate in order to increase their own human 
capital. However, because of the interrelated nature of human and social capital, it 
is often difficult empirically to isolate the effect of one from the other (Coleman, 
1988b, 1990). In the board literature, the empirical ambiguity led Hillman and 
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Dalziel (2003) to introduce the theoretical construct board capital to capture the 
combination of a board’s collective human and social capital. The board capital 
conceptualization offers “a helpful way to conceive of the primary antecedent of 
the board's provision of resources to the firm” (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003: 387). 
Recent research further develops the concept of board capital and suggests 
that it is composed of breadth and depth components (Haynes & Hillman, 2010). 
Board capital breadth captures “the portfolio of directors’ functional, 
occupational, social, professional experiences and extra-industry ties and captures 
the heterogeneity of the directors’ human and social capital;” whereas, board 
capital depth refers to “the embeddedness of directors in the firm’s primary 
industry through interlocking directorships, managerial positions, or occupational 
experience in the primary industry of the firm, and is the sum of the directors’ 
intra-industry human and social capital” (Haynes & Hillman, 2010: 1145). From 
this distinction, Haynes and Hillman (2010) find that the level of board capital 
breadth and depth directly affects organizational strategic change with board 
capital breadth leading to more strategic change while board capital depth leads to 
less strategic change. This relationship is also moderated by the level of CEO 
power in a firm.  
With the concepts of human and social capital delineated, I now turn to 
reviewing the literature on board appointments and director selection.  
 
Board Appointment and Composition Literatures 
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 In order to perform the monitoring and resource provisioning functions, 
boards must be composed of individual directors who possess the necessary mix 
of human and social capital (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Nicholson & Kiel, 2004). 
Therefore, understanding the determinants of board composition and director 
selection has been a central area for board researchers (Finkelstein et al., 2009; 
Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Much of this research focuses on the affiliation of the 
director—whether the director appointed is a firm insider or outsider—but 
research is beginning to also consider human and social capital that each director 
brings to the board (Finkelstein et al., 2009). This research stream often focuses 
on the organizational-level determinants of changes to board while neglecting the 
individual-level characteristics that lead to director appointments (for exceptions, 
see Westphal & Stern, 2006, 2007; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). Extant research 
considers a variety of different determinants that may lead to board composition 
changes and new director selection. In the following section, I first review the 
director selection process and then discuss the research studies examining board 
appointments and director selection.  
Director Selection Process 
The board appointment process is the formal process by which directors 
are selected, nominated, and appointed to a board. “Legally, it is a multistep 
process, beginning when the incumbent directors search for potential nominees 
and ending when the shareholders elect those who are nominated by the directors 
or by the shareholders themselves” (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989: 20). In most cases 
in the U.S. and U.K., the candidates for the board appointment are nominated by a 
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nominating committee composed of completely or a majority of independent 
directors (Hoskisson, Castleton, & Withers, 2009; Monks & Minow, 2004); 
however, CEOs remain a major influence over the selection process (Lorsch & 
MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1971; Monks & Minow, 1996, 2004; Vance, 1983). 
Recently, some nominating committees have also employed the services of search 
firms to improve independence and expand the number of candidates that are 
considered (Monks & Minow, 2004). After the nominating committee selects the 
initial candidates, the entire board and CEO often interview them. Those 
individuals that are deemed most qualified and the best fit for the board are 
formally nominated and voted on by the shareholders of the firm (Chisholm, 
1985; Johnson et al., 1996; Monks & Minow, 2004). Finally, the process 
culminates with the nominated candidate being “elected” onto the board often 
with no competition from other potential directors. While these candidates are 
often elected without any opposition, shareholders do have the option to withhold 
their votes (Hillman, Shropshire, Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, In press).  
The formal process begins when there is a vacancy on or expansion of the 
board. Board vacancies may occur for a variety reasons, including director 
removal, retirement, resignation or death of an incumbent director (Austin, 1985; 
Bacon & Brown, 1975; Daily & Dalton, 2004). Board expansion may occur in 
response to a request of major shareholder to place someone on the board, after an 
acquisition or merger, or a variety of other organizational considerations, such as 
a desire to increase board depth and diversity of knowledge and experiences 
(Bacon & Brown, 1975; Vance, 1968). Much of the managerial research on board 
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focuses on these organizational considerations that lead to changes in board 
composition (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra & Pearce, 
1989).  
However, in making the selection decision, the personal attributes of the 
candidate and his or her fit with the rest of the board are major determinants of 
which candidates receive a nomination (Bacon & Brown, 1975; Bazerman & 
Schoorman, 1983; Mueller, 1974; Schlueter, 1985). As Mueller (1974: 68) 
suggest, “The quality of the men and women who make up the board determines 
its performance, assuming all structural aspects are in good order.” The skills, 
experiences, expertise, and network ties of those individuals chosen to serve on 
the board directly affect its ability to carry out the board functions. As Chisholm 
(1985: 24.2) asks, “is not a board made up of a majority of qualified, competent, 
experienced, and independent individuals in a better position to perform the 
management selection and monitoring functions?” Invariably, the answer is 
“Yes.” Therefore, in making the director selection decision, firms attempt to find 
candidates with the human and social capital necessary to enable the board to 
successfully monitor and provide resources to the firm (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Nicholson & Kiel, 2004). With the board appointment process described, I now 
turn to reviewing the board research that examines changes in board composition 
and director selection.  
 
Organizational Determinants of Board Composition 
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 While the selection process is a key determinant of board composition, 
most board research focuses on organizational and external changes that provide 
the impetus for board composition changes (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Board 
composition is traditionally measured along the dimensions of board size and 
director type (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). This research considers such factors as an 
organization’s prior and current performance, its strategy, and the environment in 
which it competes (Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Research also 
examines other organizational factors, such as organizational life-cycle stage 
(Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003; Zajac & Westphal, 1996) and the influence of 
the CEO (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). 
Organizational Performance and Strategy. Research considers 
organizational performance as a key indicator of board composition change. For 
example, Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) and Weisbach (1988) find that poor 
organizational performance is positively related to increases in the proportion of 
independent directors on a board. Conversely, other research suggests that 
independent directors may be more likely to leave poor performing firms to 
protect their reputation (Fama, 1980; Finkelstein et al., 2009). Hambrick and 
D’Aveni (1992) present evidence that organizations facing bankruptcy are more 
likely to experience outside director exits as a part of a downward spiral of top 
team deterioration. Similarly, Daily and Dalton (1995) find supporting evidence 
of director turnover as firms approach bankruptcy and no evidence that the 
proportion of outsiders increase during bankruptcy. Pearce and Zahra (1992) also 
find that poor prior performance is negatively related to outsider representation on 
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the board. Arthuad-Day, Certo, Dalton, and Daily (2006) similarly find that 
directors of firms filing material financial restatements are 70 percent more likely 
to exit than those directors on firms not filing financial restatements. 
Another important determinant of board composition is the firm’s current 
strategy. For example, Pearce and Zahra (1992) find that board composition and 
size will be contingent upon the firm’s current strategy. In this case, firms 
employing diversification strategies were more likely to have larger boards and 
higher proportion of independent directors. This research suggests that certain 
strategies require different knowledge and skills from directors, and as such, 
board composition may reflect the firm’s strategies.  
Environment. Several studies also consider the role of a firm’s 
environment in determining board composition. Pfeffer (1972) examines the role 
of boards in serving as an instrument for coopting environmental 
interdependences by examining the size and composition of boards of directors of 
80 randomly selected nonfinancial corporations. In particular, he finds that firms 
may manipulate the size of their boards to create more links to the environment. 
In terms of board composition, the results suggest that firms facing greater 
environmental pressures require a higher ratio of outsiders on the board. Pfeffer 
(1972: 226) posits, “that board size and composition are not random or 
independent factors, but are, rather, rational organizational responses to the 
conditions of the external environment.” Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) further 
suggest that board composition can be manipulated to reduce uncertainty in the 
environment.  
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Provan (1980) provides evidence that firms that attract and co-opt 
powerful members of the community are able to use their boards to acquire 
critical resources from the environment. Similarly, Boeker and Goodstein (1991) 
provide evidence that the composition of the board can be modified to meet the 
demands of a changing environment. Daily and Schwenk (1996) suggest that 
outside resource dependence requirements are key factors along with other 
conditions in determining the governance structures that firms enact, whether it is 
a CEO or board dominant structure or more balanced governance structures. 
Mizruchi and Stearns (1988) find that increased dependence on financial 
institutions leads to appointments of directors from those institutions. At an 
institutional level, Sanders and Carpenter (1998) find that a firm’s level of 
internationalization is positively related to both board size and, contrary to their 
expectations, the proportion of outsiders on a board suggesting that as firms 
become more internationalized, they face more complex environments that 
require larger boards and more outsiders.  
Boyd (1990) directly examines the relationship between a firm’s external 
environment and its board size and number of interlocks. Utilizing Dess and 
Beard’s (1984) dimensions of environmental uncertainty, Boyd finds a negative 
relationship between competitive uncertainty and board size and a positive 
relationship between competitive uncertainty and number of interlocks on a 
board. His findings are important given the assumption that firms with higher 
uncertainty will have larger boards and his finds that these firms have smaller 
boards that are composed of more densely connected or “resource rich” directors. 
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Research also considers the impact of whether a firm’s industry is 
regulated or deregulated on board composition. For example, Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978: 168) propose: "Regulation, as a social process, should require 
organizations to be more concerned about their relationship with the external 
environment." In support of this proposition, Luoma and Goodstein (1999) find 
that within the context of highly regulated industries boards have higher 
proportions of directors who are non-shareholder stakeholders. Lang and Lockhart 
(1990) also find that after the deregulation of the airlines industry indirect 
interlocks between competitors increased as firms attempted to cope with the 
increase in competitive uncertainty and resource dependences. In this case, 
financial dependence was positively related to increases in the proportion of 
director interlocks with financial institutions. Hillman et al. (2000) utilize a 
taxonomy of director categories they developed to examine changes in board 
composition as firms undergo deregulation in the US airline industry. Hillman and 
colleagues find that under deregulation firms alter their board composition to 
meet the new resource dependence needs of the firm. In this case, directors with 
business experience, expertise in support functions, and relationships to the 
community are more likely to be appointed to the board after deregulation than 
during regulation.  
Life Cycle Stage. Closely related to a firm’s current strategy, the stage of 
development of the organization is also suggested to influence board composition. 
For example, with each stage of the life-cycle comes concomitant changes in the 
complexity of the firm (Dewar & Hage, 1978) and thus, Lynall and colleagues 
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(2003) argue that governance requirements will similarly change. Zahra and 
Pearce (1989: 298) agree noting “boards are expected to perform qualitatively 
different roles at various points in the cycle.” In particular, Lynall and colleagues 
examine the role of boards during the different stages of the organizational life 
cycle. Building upon Quinn and Cameron’s (1983) four-stage life cycle model, 
Lynall and colleagues examine the role of boards during the entrepreneurial stage, 
the collectivity stage, the formalization and control stage, and the structure 
elaboration and adaptation stage. They argue that different corporate governance 
perspectives (i.e., agency, resource dependence, social network, and institutional 
theories) will have differential applicability to board formation and success across 
the different stages of an organization’s life cycle. This perspective, in turn, 
suggests that the board composition is affected by the stage of organizational 
development in which the board was initially formed as well as the relative power 
of the CEO and external financiers at the time of founding. Daily and Dalton 
(1993) find a significant negative relationship between firms with founders as 
CEOs and the number and proportion of independent outside directors. Providing 
further support, Fiegener, Brown, Dreux, and Dennis (2000) find that CEOs with 
greater ownership and family stakes have boards that are less independent.  
 CEO Influence. Research also considers the role the CEO plays in 
determining director selection and board composition. For example, Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1988) find that CEO succession greatly affects board composition. In 
particular, as a CEO draws closer to retirement, inside directors are more likely to 
be added to the board potentially to be groomed for the CEO position (Mace, 
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1971; Vance, 1983). However, after the CEO retires, those inside directors with 
shorter tenures are more likely to leave the board. Westphal and Zajac (1995) 
more directly examine the influence of CEOs on the selection of directors as they 
consider demographic similarity between CEOs and those directors selected. They 
find that CEOs with greater power relative to the board attempt to select directors 
with similar demographic characteristics to themselves in order to reinforce their 
relative power. Conversely, when boards have greater relative power, new 
directors are more likely to be demographically similar to the board.  
 
Individual-Level Determinants of Board Appointments 
 While there is less research that examines director selection and exit 
(Finkelstein et al., 2009), a small but growing literature focuses more on the 
determinants of individual director appointments. For example, Gilson (1990) 
finds that directors serving on boards that enter bankruptcy are more likely to 
turnover at the focal board and less likely to obtain subsequent board 
appointments. Similarly, focusing on CEOs, Brickley, Linck, and Coles (1999) 
find that home firm performance prior to retirement is significantly related to 
continued home board service and subsequent board appointments two years after 
retirement. The retention of former CEOs on their own home board is mainly 
explained by stock returns, while subsequent outsider appointments for the former 
CEO are explained by previous accounting returns.  
 Westphal and Stern (2006; 2007) find the ingratiatory behavior may be 
another way that both top managers and directors receive additional 
appointments. Those top managers that use impression management tactics, in 
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this case ingratiation, toward their CEO are more likely to receive subsequent 
board appointments at other firms where their CEO serves and at boards 
connected to the CEO through his or her directorate network. These ingratiatory 
tactics may substitute to some degree for an individual’s elite background or 
demographic majority status (Westphal & Stern, 2006). Similarly, Westphal and 
Stern (2007) examine the ingratiatory behavior that leads directors to receive 
future board appointments. These authors again find that these impression 
management tactics along with offering advice and counseling lead to future 
appointments for directors. Westphal and Stern find that those directors that 
engage in lower levels of monitoring and control also were more likely to receive 
future appointments. In both cases, minorities required higher levels of 
ingratiatory behavior to receive future appointments and were punished more for 
engaging in monitoring and control.  
 Research also considers the appointment of minorities and females to 
corporate boards. For example, Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella (2007) 
examine the critical resources female directors may bring to a board, and apply 
RDT to identify organizational predictors of women on boards. From this 
perspective, they find that organizational size, industry type, and the extent to 
which a focal firm is linked to other firms with female directors significantly 
impact the likelihood of female representation on a corporate board. Furthermore, 
Hillman, Cannella, and Harris (2002) compare the attributes of female and 
minority directors with those of white male directors on boards in the Fortune 
1000. They find that female and minority directors are more likely to come from 
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non-business background and hold advanced degrees than their white male 
counterparts. These directors also were more likely to join additional boards at a 
much faster rate than white male directors.  
 
Summary 
 In this chapter, I have reviewed the literatures on board functions, human 
and social capital, and board composition and director selection. This review 
provides evidence of the interrelatedness of these distinct literatures as human and 
social capital enable directors to perform the board functions, and those directors 
that are better able to perform these board appointments are more likely to garner 
future board appointments. However, from the review of the board composition 
and director selection literatures, it is evident that more research is needed to 
formally understand the specific relationships between a director’s human and 
social capital and future board appointments. In the next chapter, I delve into 
these relationships by building an individual-level model of director selection and 
mobility.  
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Chapter 3 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Building upon human and social capital perspectives along with the 
integrated agency and resource dependence perspectives of boards, in this chapter 
I develop an individual level model of director selection and mobility. In 
developing this individual-level perspective of board appointments, I distinguish 
between a number of specific dimensions of the director mobility outcome, 
including the likelihood of joining a new board, a prestigious board, exiting a 
current board. To understand the antecedents of these dimensions of director 
mobility, I focus on a number of indicators of human and social capital, including 
educational level, expertise, director experience, and access to network structural 
holes. 
 In this chapter, I delineate each of the abovementioned dimensions of 
director mobility and consider the role of human and social capital in predicting 
these dimensions. I then consider a number of individual- and contextual- 
variables the may moderate the relationship between the human and social capital 
indicators and director mobility. These include gender, a director’s exit from 
current boards in the previous period, director stigmatization from financial 
restatements, and the industry conditions in which the director serves. Figure 1 
represents my overall research model of the proposed hypotheses in this 
dissertation.  
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---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Likelihood of Joining a New Board.  
 The likelihood of joining a new board captures the probability that a 
director will receive a future board appointment with another firm. A vacant 
director position may be due in part to “retirements, voluntary (or involuntary) 
exits, or board expansion” (Daily & Dalton, 2004: 8). When a board attempts to 
fill a vacant position on the board, a key driver of this decision is the potential 
appointee’s ability to provide monitoring and other critical resources to the focal 
board. At the individual level, a director’s ability to fulfill these board functions 
depends on his or her level of human and social capital (Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003). Directors with higher levels of human capital, including educational level, 
expertise, and labor market experience (Hogan & McPheters, 1980; Shanahan & 
Tuma, 1994), should be more likely to receive new appointments relative to an 
individual with lower levels of human capital.  
 The educational component of human capital serves as a signal on the 
labor market for directors (Spence, 1973, 1974). A director’s level of educational 
achievement and affiliation signals to potential firms that the individual has the 
intellectually ability necessary to perform monitoring and offer advice and 
counsel to the firm’s management. A potential director may also offer prestige to 
the hiring firm through his or her educational affiliation (D'Aveni, 1990). This 
level of prestige may enable the director to provide the critical resource of 
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legitimacy to the hiring firm. In support of these relationships, Useem and 
Karabel (1986) find the educational background, in part, determine an 
individual’s ability to obtain board appointments. Thus, directors with higher 
levels of education are more likely to receive subsequent board appointments. 
Therefore,  
Hypothesis 1a: Directors with higher levels of education will be more 
likely to join a new board.  
 
A director’s specific expertise should also directly affect his or her ability 
to join new boards. From resource dependence theory, each director does not 
provide the exact same resource to an organization. Rather, directors are brought 
on to provide a number of critical but different resources to a board (Hillman et 
al., 2000; Pfeffer, 1972). From this perspective, directors are heterogeneous with a 
variety of expertise that they can provide to a board (Kesner, 1988). 
 By examining the unique resources that directors provide, Hillman and 
colleagues develop a taxonomy of director categories—insiders, business experts, 
support specialists, and community influentials. While their specific interest was 
in examining the different resources directors bring to a board, I use this 
taxonomy to examine directors’ different expertise that they may provide to a 
board. In this regard, I focus on the three types of outside directors specified by 
Hillman and colleagues2
                                                 
2 I do not explicitly hypothesize a relationship between insiders and board 
appointments for several reasons. First, insiders are selected because of their 
specific knowledge of the current firm. Second, because of recent changes to 
legislation and stock exchange policies, many firms now only have one insider on 
the board—the CEO. This trend as dramatically decreased the proportion of 
insiders in the total population of corporate directors. Thus, while I recognize the 
. 
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 Business experts are current or retired executives of other for-profit 
firms and directors who serve on other large corporate boards (Hillman et al., 
2000). These directors provide unique expertise and knowledge to a board from 
their experiences in decision-making in other firms. These individuals offer 
general knowledge in the strategy development and implementation akin to the 
general human capital reviewed earlier by Becker (1964).  
 The support specialists are technical professionals, such as lawyers, 
bankers, and public relations experts, who provide specific expertise in the firm’s 
support activities (Baysinger & Zardkoohi, 1986; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hillman 
et al., 2000). The technical expertise these support specialists possess is a highly 
valued dimension for directors to hold (Vance, 1968).  
 Finally, community influentials provide “experience and linkages 
relevant to the firm’s environment beyond competitor firms and suppliers” 
(Hillman et al., 2000: 241). These individuals may be current and former 
government officials, university faculty, and leaders of social or community 
organizations. In this capacity, these directors provide direct links to the external 
environment for the firm (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). As Dill (1985: 55.9) 
suggests, “Directors have the responsibility of helping management balance 
community issues with more narrow economic calculations, whether in deciding 
how to handle the future of a particular factory or office or in deciding what 
stance the company should take about legislation that might restrict their freedom 
in handling plant closings.” In this capacity, community influentials provide a 
                                                                                                                                     
importance of these directors, I do not explicitly examine their subsequent board 
appointments.  
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direct link to the community and may help management avoid potential missteps 
or conflicts with important constituencies and other community organizations.  
 While each of these directors brings a unique resource to a board, there 
are a number of reasons to suggest that business experts may be more likely to 
receive new appointments relative to support specialists and community 
influentials. First, business expertise is often a highly sought after commodity on 
the market for corporate directors (Alibrandi, 1985; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988; 
Vance, 1968). “The experience sought most, and valued most highly by many 
chief executives in considering candidates, is that of successfully running a 
corporation” (Bacon & Brown, 1975: 31). Those individuals with executive 
experience have often developed expertise necessary to offer strategic advice and 
counsel to top managers. As Fich (2005: 1947) posits, “such unique managerial 
talent is sought by firms looking to appoint outside directors to their boards and 
recognized by investors as value enhancing.”  
 Directors currently serving in the role of business expert for other boards 
are not only signaling their managerial expertise to the market but also signaling 
their ability to provide this expertise to other firms. Firms and boards look for 
those members that have the experience necessary to help their top executives 
make decisions for the organization (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988). Similarly, a 
business expert’s expertise represents tacit knowledge from the individual’s 
previous experience making business decisions, and, as such, is not easily 
codified and absorbed by a board.  
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 Conversely, the expertise that support specialists and community 
influentials bring to a board may be more easily replaced by a firm because of the 
tacit nature of their expertise relative to the general managerial expertise held by 
business experts. For example, Mizruchi, Stearns, and Marquis (2006) examine 
the decreasing proportion of bankers on corporate boards between 1973 and 1994, 
and suggest that this decline is in part due to the increasing prominence of chief 
financial officers. As the authors suggest:  
The increased prominence of the CFO meant that the CEO now had a 
financial specialist to consult on a regular basis. Bankers on the board as 
advisors were no longer as essential, which may account for their decline. 
Moreover, the financial tools available to the firm were becoming 
increasingly complex, and reliance on traditional sources of funding from 
banks and insurance companies declined (2006: 316).  
In turn, this suggests that the support function and specialized technical expertise 
that bankers were providing in the past to organizations were easily appropriated 
by firms by absorbing this expertise in the form of financial experts within the 
firm. Therefore,  
Hypothesis 1b: Directors with business expertise will be more likely to 
join a new board relative to directors with community or support 
specialist expertise.  
 
 Directors with higher levels of labor market experience are more likely 
to join a new board. This labor market experience is the culmination of a 
director’s experiences on current and previous boards. Directors with higher 
levels of experience may be also signal to potential boards their ability to provide 
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monitoring and number of critical resources. In particular, director experience 
may suggest to potential boards that the individual director has developed the 
information processing capacity and individual-level capabilities necessary to 
evaluate high level strategic decision making and provide useful strategic advice 
and counsel (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). Serving on different boards also 
exposes directors to a variety of strategic knowledge and perspectives that may be 
utilized on subsequent boards (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1971). As 
Carpenter and Westphal (2001: 640) indicate, “Such learning is particularly vivid 
because directors observe the decision-making process firsthand in their 
monitoring role, participate actively by giving advice to management, and then 
witness the consequences of those decisions.” Directors with higher levels of 
experience as a director also may develop transferable competencies in 
monitoring and resource provisioning that other firms may benefit from. Thus, 
directors with more experience as a director often have more cumulative 
experience with the board roles and functions. Thus,  
Hypothesis 1c: Directors with more director experience will be more 
likely to join a new board.  
 
 Along with human capital, a director’s level of social capital also 
influences the likelihood of joining a new board. In particular, a director’s 
network position should greatly influence his or her likelihood of receiving 
subsequent board appointments. A director’s level of social capital directly affects 
the individual’s ability to provide critical resources to the firm (Kim, 2007; Kim 
& Cannella, 2008). In this regard, a director’s network position offers firms 
legitimatizing signals that enable them to gain access to critical resources (Certo, 
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2003). Therefore, I focus on a director’s network position, in particular, his or her 
access to structural holes (Burt, 1992). A structural hole represents a non-
redundant tie between actors that provides “an opportunity to broker the flow of 
information between people and control the form of projects that bring together 
people from opposite sides of the hole” (Burt, 1997: 340).  
 Similarly, those directors that hold network positions that offer access to 
other unconnected firms and individuals are more likely to represent opportunities 
for firms to acquire linkages to new resources and external contingencies (Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978). In particular, the structural network position of director may 
offer firms direct access to critical resources (Mizruchi, 1996). The director’s 
network position may allow the individual to serve as a conduit for information 
flow between the focal firm and other critical firms and resource providers 
(Haunschild, 1993).  
Research also suggests that a director’s level social capital may inherently 
provide opportunities for future board appointments (Useem, 1984; Westphal & 
Milton, 2000; Westphal & Stern, 2006, 2007; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). In 
describing the relationship between social capital and board appointment, Useem 
(1984: 51) provides: 
When managers holding outside directorships were asked to describe how 
at least one of the directorships was initiated, in more than three out of 
four instances they identified factors unrelated to trade or any other strictly 
business relation between the companies. Commonly, the man was already 
personally acquainted with the chairman or other directors on the board he 
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was asked to join. Such contacts stemmed from a range of sources. Often, 
they had a prior business relationship—but not as a product of any dealing 
between the two companies. The individuals might have served together, 
for instance, on another corporate board, or perhaps on a business 
association task force.  
From this perspective, a director’s personal and professional relationships provide 
a web of connections to potential future board seats. A director’s network position 
also may enable the individual to garner more positive attention for current board 
appointments, and thus increasing the opportunity for joining a new board (Davis, 
1993). A director’s access to structural holes not only offers hiring boards an 
indication of the director’s ability to provide a number of critical resources to the 
firm but may serve as the means by which the director obtains the appointment. 
Therefore,  
Hypothesis 1d: Directors with access to more structural holes will be 
more likely to join a new board.  
 
 
Joining a Prestigious Board 
 Research on board of directors considers the opportunity for more 
prestigious board appointments as a key motivator for individual directors (Lorsch 
& MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1971; Zajac, 1988). In examining directors’ individual 
motives to serve on a board, Mace (1971: 109) finds that “Directors accept board 
memberships, not for income, but for the opportunity to learn how other 
companies operate and for the prestige value derived from an identification with 
other impressive names.” From this perspective, directors often seek high-status 
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appointments to continually develop their human capital and garner more prestige 
and social status. Similarly, research finds that director that serve on superior 
performing firm are subsequently appointed to higher quality boards (Gupta, 
Otley, & Young, 2008).  
 A director’s level of human capital should directly affect whether the 
director joins other prestigious boards. Directors with higher levels of human 
capital in the form of educational achievement and affiliation, business expertise, 
and labor market experience are more likely to obtain subsequent appointments at 
prestigious firms. Because of their unique stock of human capital, these directors 
are more likely to be highly valued on the market for corporate directors. This 
valuation, in turn, allows them to more discriminately choose which boards they 
serve on and provides the opportunity to place at more prestigious board seats.  
 A director’s level of social capital should also affect whether a director 
obtains a more or less prestigious subsequent board appointment. Because of the 
value and rarity of the external connections and network information flows from 
their access to structural holes, these individuals are more likely to be pursued by 
higher prestige boards. The director’s network positions may also afford them the 
network connection necessary to obtain higher status board appointments. 
Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2a: Directors with higher levels of education will be more 
likely to join a more prestigious board.  
 
Hypothesis 2b: Directors with business expertise will be more likely to 
join a more prestigious board relative to directors with community or 
support specialist expertise.  
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Hypothesis 2c: Directors with more director experience will be more 
likely to join a more prestigious board.  
 
Hypothesis 2d: Directors with access to more structural holes will be 
more likely to join a more prestigious board.  
 
The Likelihood of Exiting a Current Board 
 The likelihood of exiting a current board also represents a critical outcome 
in understanding the board appointment process. The likelihood of exiting a 
current board reflects the length of time the director remains on the subsequent 
board after his or her initial appointment. In this regard, exiting a current board 
may provide an indicator of the value of a director’s human and social capital 
(Castanias & Helfat, 1991, 2001; Wang & Barney, 2006). However, this 
relationship between human and social capital and voluntary turnover is rather 
complex when viewed from the individual-level perspective (Dess & Shaw, 
2001). From this perspective, a director with higher levels of human and social 
capital may be likely to exit a board because of his or her increased value on the 
labor market, in this case the market for corporate directors (Acemoglu & 
Pischke, 1998, 1999; Jovanovic, 1979). In this regard, directors with higher levels 
of human and social capital may simply be more likely to exit on board because 
their able to easily gain access to new board seats. Conversely, directors with 
lower levels of human and social capital or human and social capital that are 
easily substituted for on the market may be less likely to exit a current board 
because of their decreased prospects of obtaining new appointments3
                                                 
3 Because my level of analysis is at the individual level, I focus on a director’s 
overall likelihood to exit a board and not a particular board, which would require 
a board- or firm-level of analysis. Similarly, a board- or firm-level focus may 
.  
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As previously discussed, directors with higher human capital in the form 
of educational achievement and affiliation, business expertise, and director 
experience are more likely to be highly valued on the market for corporate 
directors and, thus, may have more opportunities for future appointments. In this 
regard, each of these different human capital dimensions provide signals to other 
potential boards of the value of the resources that these directors may bring to the 
hiring firm (Spence, 1974). In support of the role of education in influencing 
turnover intentions and actual turnover, Benson, Finegold, and Mohrman (2004) 
and Benson (2006) find that employees that are working on a degree while 
employed at a focal firm are more likely to exit that firm after obtaining the 
degree. Relatedly, Trevor (2001) posits and finds that as education serves as a 
signal to the job market it also increases an individual’s ease of movement across 
different employers. In other words, education increases the mobility of an 
individual across a variety of employment contexts.  
As abovementioned, a director’s expertise may similarly increase the 
opportunities that a director has for board appointments. Taking this a step 
further, this increase in board opportunities also increases the likelihood that a 
director will exit a current board to pursue these other opportunities. In particular, 
directors with business expertise may be more likely to exit a current board, 
relative to support specialist and community influentials because of the high 
                                                                                                                                     
provide substantially different hypotheses. For example, from a firm level 
perspective, firms have a strong desire to keep directors with higher levels of 
human and social capital. In this regard, my test of the likelihood of exiting a 
current board is less a reflection of the tenure of a director on a particular board 
and more another overall indicator of director mobility on the market for 
corporate directors. 
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transferability of their business-related skills to other boards. In this regard, 
“because such skills increase an individual's potential value to external firms, 
human capital theory holds that general, transferable skills lead to an individual's 
relative ease of movement in the job market” (Trevor, 2001: 625). A community 
influential’s expertise may be more firm-specific as this type of director is 
brought onto a board to meet firm specific needs to influence external 
constituents. Conversely, a support specialist’s expertise may be less firm-
specific, and thus, highly transferable, because of the occupation-based rather 
than firm-based training (Trevor, 2001). However, as previously discussed, this 
expertise on the market for corporate directors may be less unique relative to 
business expertise because of the number of substitute individuals possessing 
similar expertise and because of the easy codification of support specialist 
expertise. Thus, community influentials and support specialists may be less likely 
to exit a current board than business experts.  
Finally, from the human capital perspective, director experience should 
influence the overall mobility of a director, and in turn, the likelihood of a director 
exits a current board. Previous research suggests that labor market experience is 
negatively related to job turnover because of the relationship between experience 
and age (e.g., Ghosh, 2007; Mincer & Jovanovic, 1981). This research, in turn, 
suggests that as labor market experience increases so to does the individual’s 
desire to increase firm-specific investments of human capital. Furthermore, these 
firm-specific investments of human and social capital decrease an individual’s 
overall mobility across employers (Becker, 1964; Wang & Barney, 2006). Thus, 
   48 
labor market experience should decrease mobility and the likelihood of exiting a 
current board. However, research also proposes that professional employees, such 
as directors, may be less focused on firm-specific investments and thus less 
limited in their mobility. For example, Parsons (1972) suggest that professional 
employees are likely to be highly mobile employees. Parsons posits that “The 
proportion of professional workers […] has no obvious relationship with specific 
training, since such workers, although highly specialized, frequently have little 
firm-specific capital” (1133). Similarly, directors, as professional employees, may 
be less focused on developing firm-specific human and social capital as they sit 
on board and more focused on transferable skills they can bring back to their 
home firm or utilize on other boards. In support of this perspective, Lorsch and 
MacIver (1989: 28) find that the top personal benefits a director derives from 
board membership include (in order of most important): (1) “Opportunity to 
Learn,” (2) “Seeing new businesses” and (3) “Establishing contacts to enhance 
other business relationships.” In others, directors seek out board appointments that 
are more likely to provide them with transferable skills benefit their mobility as a 
director and as an executive. As such, for directors, who are specifically focused 
on developing transferable skills, increases in director experience may increase 
their overall mobility and, thus, increase their likelihood of exiting a current 
board.  
 Similarly, an individual’s social capital should greatly influence his or 
her job potential mobility and actual movement (Dess & Shaw, 2001). In this 
particular context, a director’s social capital also should greatly influence the 
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likelihood of exiting a current board. Directors that provide unique and valuable 
connections to and external information sources from the external environment 
should experience an increase in their value on the market for corporate directors 
because of their unique connections and information sources (Kim, 2007; Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978). Directors with greater access to structural holes may be more 
likely to easily garner new board appointments, and thus, experience an increased 
likelihood of exit on a current board because of these connections. 
 Therefore, I hypothesize that directors with higher levels of human and 
social capital are more likely to exit a current board relative to directors with 
lower levels of human and social capital. Thus,  
Hypothesis 3a: Directors with higher levels of education will be more 
likely to exit a current board.  
 
Hypothesis 3b: Directors with business expertise will be more likely to exit 
a current board relative to directors with community or support specialist 
expertise.  
 
Hypothesis 3c: Directors with higher levels of director experience will be 
more likely to exit a current board. 
 
Hypothesis 3d: Directors with access to more structural holes will more 




To provide a more nuanced understanding of the relationships between 
human and social capital and the director mobility outcomes, I incorporate 
research from the human capital, social capital, and board literatures to propose 
several moderators to these relationships. I examine the individual-level variable 
gender and its importance to the proposed main effects. Research on director 
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selection considers gender as an important determinants of director selection (e.g., 
Hillman et al., 2002), and as such, may have a moderating impact on the 
relationship between human and social capital and director mobility. Research 
from the human and social capital theory perspectives also recognizes a number 
of factors that influence human and social capital in general (Coleman, 1988a; 
Moreh, 1973). These include previous mobility (Farber, 1994) and stigmatization 
(Lochner, 2004). I take each of these factors in turn and consider them in the 
context of corporate directors and how they moderate the human and social 
capital-board appointments relationship. Finally, I consider the environmental 
context in which a director serves. Environmental dynamism may directly affect a 
director’s ability to utilize and maintain his or her human and social capital, and 
thus, may affect the director’s ability to garner board appointments.  
Gender 
Gender represents an important potential moderating variable influencing 
the relationship between a director’s human and social capital and director 
mobility. Gender has long been of interest to board and upper echelons research. 
This is partly due to the relatively lower proportion of females on corporate 
boards compared to their male counterpart (Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 1999). 
However, research also suggests that female directors often bring unique 
resources and expertise to the boardroom that may affect firm performance 
(Burke, 1997; Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003; Hillman et al., 2007). In 
particular, using a resource dependence lens, Hillman and colleagues (2007) 
suggest that female directors may offer boards the ability to provide advice and 
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counsel, legitimacy, and communication, commitment, and other resources. These 
female directors do so by bringing diversity to the decision-making process 
through their unique experiences, beliefs, and perspectives. These female 
directors “bring different perspectives and concerns to the board room from those 
of white male directors, and the articulation of these perspectives and concerns is, 
in the main, welcomed” (Bacon & Brown, 1975: 43).  
Hillman, Cannella, and Harris (2002) extend this logic further to suggest 
the female directors may experience different patterns in their directorships 
compared to their male counterparts. In particular, female director will be more 
likely to serve on multiple boards and are more likely to join subsequent boards at 
a much faster rate than white directors. This is due, in part, to a variety of reasons. 
First, by serving on boards, these female directors demonstrate managerial and 
business expertise that is often perceived as lacking in women because of their 
relative absence in executive suites. This signals to the market for corporate 
directors that these individuals are likely candidates for future board 
appointments. The attainment of current board seats provides status and visibility 
in the business community, which again females often lack relative to their male 
counterparts. Finally, female directors also demonstrate a level of community 
with other directors through successful service on corporate boards that may 
reduce any anxiety that come along with accepting the addition of a director who 
is different and somewhat unknown to existing directors (Hillman et al., 2002). 
Therefore, directors with higher levels of education, business expertise, director 
experience, and access to structural holes are more likely to receive new board 
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appointments when they are female. Furthermore, from their increased status and 
unique resources, these directors also are more likely to join prestigious boards 
relative to their past board appointments. Finally, because of their unique 
resources (Burke, 1997; Erhardt et al., 2003; Hillman et al., 2007), these directors 
may have more opportunities for new appointments, and, thus, female directors 
are more likely to experience exit from current and subsequent board 
appointments. Therefore,  
Hypothesis 4: Gender will moderate the relationship between human and 
social capital and subsequent board appointments such that directors with 
higher levels of education, expertise, experience and access to structural 
holes that are female will be more likely to experience (a) an increased 
likelihood of joining a new board, (b) an increased likelihood of join a 
more prestigious board, and (c) a increased likelihood of exiting a current 
board. 
 
Previous Board Exit  
In hypotheses 3a-d, I posit that directors with higher levels of human and 
social capital may be more employable to other boards and thus more likely to 
exit a current board. This further suggests that the previous departure from a 
board may likely influence an individual’s ability to obtain new appointments and 
the likelihood of exiting a current board. In support of this perspective, at a more 
general level, human and social capital research suggest that prior job change 
influences future employee mobility (Farber, 1994). From this perspective, 
directors that have previously exited a board in the previous period may be more 
likely to enter a new board in the current period but may also be more likely to 
exit a current board as well. From hypotheses 3a-d, director exit may reflect a 
director’s overall market mobility; however, if these individuals do not actually 
   53 
join a new board or maintain other current boards after departing from a board in 
the previous period, there may be a loss of overall mobility. Thus, directors are 
incentivized to join new boards and maintain current boards when exiting a board 
in the previous period.  
One factor leading to the likelihood of entering a new board after 
previously exiting a board in the prior period may be the desire to avoid 
underutilization of human and social capital, which would decrease the directors 
overall mobility on the market for corporate directors. Underutilization of human 
and social capital represents the “[u]nemployment, under-employment and non-
participation in the labour force” that affects the value of an individual’s level of 
human and social capital (Moreh, 1973: 279). Both human and social capital 
require active engagement and utilization to maintain their optimally-performing 
condition. However, when these forms of capital are not in use, they begin to 
deteriorate and decline. As Schultz (1961: 13) suggests, “human capital 
deteriorates when it is idle.” Similarly, social capital requires the interaction with 
others to maintain it (Bourdieu, 1986; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). When this 
opportunity to interact is not available, social capital begins to deteriorate and 
decline. Thus, human and social capital are not unlike other forms of capital, such 
as physical capital—human and social capital increase when used (Bourdieu, 
1986), and decrease when underutilized. Furthermore, the longer the period of 
underutilization, the more an individual experiences deterioration in both human 
and social capital.  
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Research in both human and social capital perspectives generally supports 
this conclusion. Within human capital theory, research examining deterioration of 
human capital recognizes that periods of underutilization of human capital, such 
as during periods of unemployment, negatively affects an individual’s level of 
human capital (Blanchard & Summers, 1986; Moller, 1990; Moreh, 1973; 
Schultz, 1961). Moreh (1973: 279) suggests that “[u]nemployment, under-
employment and non-participation in the labour force affect average earnings 
capacity for persons out of school, and they also affect the estimates of 
deterioration.” Individuals experiencing unemployment are unable to maintain 
and develop their skills by working and utilizing the capital (Blanchard & 
Summers, 1986). Furthermore, research on social capital suggests that if 
individuals do not interact within their social networks the individuals’ social 
capital may begin to decay (Coleman, 1990).  
When an executive or director is not currently actively serving or takes a 
break from serving as a director for an extend period, the human capital the 
individual accumulated over his or her time as a director or executive may not be 
maintained and therefore may begin to diminish. To avoid this possibility, those 
directors that exit a board in the prior period may be much more likely to enter a 
current board in order to avoid the deterioration of human capital.  
The social capital of the director also is negatively affected as the time 
between director appointments increases. During periods of non-participation in 
the director market, individuals lose the density of their social network, thus 
reducing their social capital. A director’s network connections can begin to 
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deteriorate when a director is removed from the context in which these networks 
are developed (Lester et al., 2008). Lester and colleagues (2008) give the example 
of directors who were former government officials:  
“Many of those others the person is connected to are powerful individuals 
inside government, whose cooperation, coordination, and support are 
needed (Granovetter, 1973)—precisely the same others that make the 
former government official highly valuable as a prospective director. 
However, over time, those other powerful individuals retire, are replaced, 
or simply feel less obligated to respond to the former official. This process 
greatly depreciates the social capital that the government official 
accumulated while in office” (Lester et al., 2008: 1002).  
When directors do not have the opportunity to utilize their skills, expertise, and 
abilities, and their network connections, their human and social capital begins to 
deteriorate. However, those directors with higher levels of human and social 
capital may be more likely to enter a board after exiting one in the previous period 
to avoid such deterioration of their skills. In this regard, directors with higher 
levels of education, business expertise, director experience, and access to 
structural holes are more likely to receive new board appointments when they exit 
a board in the previous period. Relatedly, directors previously departing from a 
current board may be less likely to exit a current board because exiting multiple 
boards in subsequent time periods may indicate that director is experiencing 
deterioration in his or her human and social capital. To avoid this perception, 
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these directors may attempt to maintain indicators of human and social capital by 
maintaining any current appointments. Therefore,  
Hypothesis 5: A director’s departure from a board will moderate the 
relationship between human and social capital and subsequent board 
appointments such that directors with higher levels of education, expertise, 
experience and access to structural holes who exit a board in the previous 
period will be more likely to experience (a) an increased likelihood of 
joining a new board, (b) an increased likelihood of join a more prestigious 
board, and (c) an decreased likelihood of exiting another board. 
 
Director Stigmatization  
 Director stigmatization, in the form of being associated with a financial 
restatement on a board in which an individual currently serves, may also influence 
the relationship between human and social capital and subsequent board 
appointments. “Stigmatization is the social process by which a person with an 
offending attribute […] is denigrated” (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008: 232). The process 
may involve a social sanction or otherwise a reduction in the prestige, legitimacy, 
or credibility of an individual because the individual violated some sort of social 
norm or generally accepted principle of morality. The violation damages the 
offender’s trustworthiness, and reduces others’ willingness to trade, confide, or 
share with the offender. This stigma may derive from a director occupying a 
board seat or executive position in a firm that is experiencing organizational 
crisis, such as poor performance or failure (D'Aveni, 1990; Wiesenfeld et al., 
2008) or corporate scandal (Arthaud-Day et al., 2006). Stigmatized directors 
experience damage to their personal reputations and a reduction in their 
opportunities to join future boards (Fama, 1980; Wiesenfeld et al., 2008). Thus, 
stigma leads to a diminished impact of human and social capital on important 
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board appointment outcomes. This reduction in human and social capital reduces 
the individual’s opportunities to utilize or maintain their human capital.  
 In the case of corporate directors, researchers examine the stigmatization 
of individual directors from the concept of the market for “settling up” (Fama, 
1980; Wiesenfeld et al., 2008). This market for “settling up” leads directors to 
ensure the firm’s performance remains strong and that no ethical violations occur 
under their watch so they do not receive future sanctions in the form of reduced 
opportunity to serve on other boards due to poor performance in the director role 
(Zajac & Westphal, 1996).  
 As a director experiences stigmatization, such as the association with a 
financial restatement on a current board in which he or she serves, the individual’s 
ability to garner new board seats from his or her human and social capital may 
diminish. Stigmatized directors receive a reduction in value of the human and 
social capital on the market for corporate directors and are less likely to be 
appointed as directors for other firms in the future. Similarly, the stigmatization 
reduces a director’s ability to acquire resources for a focal firm, and as such, 
reduces the value of his or her human and social capital. Similarly, the stigma 
event may signal to the market for corporate directors that the stigmatized director 
has diminished human and social capital needed to perform his or her director 
duties. Therefore, directors experiencing stigma from a financial restatement on a 
current board in which they serve are less likely to be appointed to subsequent 
boards.  
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In particular, if these stigmatized directors do receive subsequent 
appointments, they are less likely to be more prestigious appointments. From this 
perspective, the market of corporate directors serves as a governance mechanism 
to punish those directors who have not carried out their board functions on their 
focal firms (Fama, 1980). Therefore, any subsequent appointments will be less 
likely to be more prestigious appointment in order to “settle up” the director’s 
poor performance in averting the event that lead to the restatement in the focal 
firm.  
Finally, because of the diminished impact of the human and social capital 
derived from the stigmatization these individuals may be more likely to exit a 
current board appointment. Again, these board appointments will often be 
structural downgrades for the stigmatized directors. Thus, these stigmatized 
directors are more likely to experience subsequent board appointments. Therefore,  
Hypothesis 6: A financial restatement on a current board will moderate 
the relationship between human and social capital and subsequent board 
appointments such that directors with higher levels of education, business 
expertise, director experience and access to structural holes will be more 
likely to experience (a) a decreased likelihood of joining a new board, (b) 
a decreased likelihood of join a more prestigious board, and (c) an 




Finally, the environmental conditions in which the director serves may 
also have a profound effect on the individual’s subsequent appointments. 
Research suggests that firms experiencing higher levels of environmental 
dynamism are more likely to benefit from the monitoring and resources provided 
by its directors (Boyd, 1990; Burt, 1983; Chatterjee & Harrison, 2001; Pfeffer, 
   59 
1972). However, those directors that provide such resources to these firms in 
dynamic environments may be less likely to use their human and social capital to 
obtain new appointments.  
Environmental dynamism is the degree of change, and the corresponding 
uncertainty and instability in the environment as a result (Dess & Beard, 1984; 
Sharfman & Dean, 1991; Thompson, 1967). Industries lower in environmental 
dynamism consist of environments where change is usually linear and predictable, 
the market boundaries and industry structures are fairly stable, and the firms, 
competitors, and customers are well known and all have an ample amount of 
knowledge about the marketplace (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Conversely, 
industries higher in environmental dynamism are typified by high rates of 
nonlinear and often unpredictable change and relative instability in market 
boundaries and industry structures, and the firms, competitors, and customers are 
not well established and little is known about the marketplace (Eisenhardt, 1989b; 
Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). In these environments, change is rapid and 
unpredictable.  
The value of directors’ human and social capital in obtaining future board 
appointments is influenced by environmental turbulence, especially at high levels. 
Human capital, such as skills, expertise, and experience, is especially valuable 
when they can be transferred and applied in different situations (Sturman, Walsh, 
& Cheramie, 2008). Thus, directors with high levels of human capital are 
successful at applying previously accumulated knowledge and skills to the focal 
firm. However, those directors in more complex environments may experience 
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less benefit from the human capital because of the constraint the environment 
places on its use. In this case, directors serving on boards in more complex 
environments may be less likely to seek out and join new boards because of the 
time and commitment serving on a board in a dynamic environment requires. In 
support of this perspective, Lorsch and MacIver (1989) find that a “lack of time” 
was the top reason for declining an offer to join a board. In this regard, these 
directors may be attempting to avoid becoming overboarded (e.g., Core, 
Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006; Harris & Shimizu, 2004).  
The impact of social capital on board appointments is also affected by 
environmental turbulence. Highly dynamic environments create an increase in 
uncertainty and volatility. Investment patterns may shift, firm boundaries may be 
adjusted, and assignments may change for personnel. If executives are held 
responsible or scapegoated for performance failures associated with 
environmental conditions, executive turnover may increase. Similarly, more 
turbulent environments may increase the change in network relationships. Thus, 
individual relationships are likely to be affected and, in turn, affect the director’s 
ability to obtain benefits from their structural position in the network.  
Because of the demands of serving on boards in dynamic environments, 
directors with higher levels of education, expertise, experience and access to 
structural holes may be less likely to obtain new appointments or may be willing 
to turn down these appointments because of the commitment to their current 
board appointments. Furthermore, because of the industry turbulence and the 
rapid change that follows, these directors may experience less duration at current 
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and subsequent board seats, and thus may be more likely to exit a current board 
seat. Highly turbulent environments also may change such that the directors 
human and social are less valuable to the organization. The environmental 
conditions may be sufficiently turbulent enough to significantly alter the business 
practices and significantly alter the resource dependence relationships for the 
firm. In this case, the director’s human and social capital may not match the 
firm’s current industry environment, and thus, may increase a director’s 
likelihood of exiting a board in more dynamic environments. Thus,  
Hypothesis 7: A director’s average dynamism from his/her other current 
board seats will moderate the relationship between human and social 
capital and subsequent board appointments such that directors with higher 
levels of education, business expertise, director experience and access to 
structural holes that serve in more dynamic environments will be more 
likely to experience (a) a decreased likelihood of joining a new board, (b) 
a decreased likelihood of join a more prestigious board, and (c) an 
increased likelihood of exiting a current board. 
 
Summary 
In this chapter, I have delineated several dimensions of director mobility 
that may be important to director’s ability to perform the board functions. In 
particular, I have suggested three dimensions of director mobility—the likelihood 
of joining a new board, a more prestigious board, and finally, exiting a current 
board. In addition, I have integrated human and social capital perspectives to 
hypothesize individual-level determinants of subsequent board appointments. I 
also have argued that a variety of individual and contextual variables conspire to 
influence the relationship between a director’s level of human and social capital 
and subsequent board appointments. With my theory and hypotheses laid out, I 
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now turn my attention in the next chapter to discuss my methodology for 
examining and testing the proposed hypotheses. 
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Chapter 4 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter reviews my sample and methodological approach for testing 
the hypotheses in Chapter 3. It is divided into three sections. First, I discuss my 
sample. Second, I discuss the operationalization of the constructs from my 
theoretical model. Finally, I discuss the statistical analyses used to test the 
proposed hypotheses.  
Sample 
 
My sample is drawn from the population of corporate directors residing on 
boards in the S&P 500 during 1996. I used a random sampling technique to 
capture directors currently serving on at least one S&P 500 board in the IRRC 
Director database. I focused on independent directors who had no previous or 
current employment link to the current board. To test my hypotheses, I collected 
data on 750 independent directors from 1996-2006. I gathered director-level data 
from several sources, including BoardEx, IRRC Director database, the Who’s 
Who Directory of Corporate America, and company proxy statements. Firm- and 
industry-level data were collected from Compustat and the CRSP database. 
However, because of missing data on either individual-level information or 
current and subsequent board appointments, my final sample consisted of 736 
directors. While I followed these directors from 1996-2006, the first possible 
event (either entry onto a new or exit off of current board) occurred in 1997, thus 
my analysis included 7360 individual-time observations.  
 
 





Likelihood of Joining a New Board. The likelihood of joining a new board 
captures the probability of receiving subsequent board appointments. The variable 
is measured as 1 when a director joins another U.S. public corporation as an 
outside director, and 0 otherwise. 
Joining a Prestigious Board. The likelihood of joining a prestigious board 
captures the structural position of the subsequent board appointment relatively to 
the director’s previous appointments. To measure this construct, I examine 
whether the new appointment is currently listed on the Fortune 100 or not.  
Likelihood of Exiting a Current Board. The likelihood of exiting a current 
board captures the probability a director leaves a current board position. The 
variable is measured as 1 if a director exits any of the individual’s current 
corporate directorships in the current time period and 0 otherwise. 
Independent Variables 
Educational Level. The educational-level component of human capital is 
measured with two indicators—Advanced Degree and Educational Prestige. The 
variable advanced degree captures whether the individual obtained an advanced 
degree with directors coded as 1 if they had earned a doctoral-level degree in any 
field (e.g., Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.), Doctor of Jurisprudence (J.D.), or a 
Medical Doctorate (M.D.)) and 0 if they had not. To capture educational prestige, 
I follow D’Aveni (1990) and Finkelstein’s (1992) measure of educational prestige 
by coding directors as 1 if they had attend an elite undergraduate institution and 0 
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otherwise, and 1 if they have attended an elite graduate program in business, 
economics, or law (See Appendix I for Finkelstein’s list of elite educational 
institutions). 
Director Expertise. To measure a director’s expertise, I utilize Hillman 
and colleagues’ (2000) delineation of director categories, which examines the 
unique resources, and in turn the type of expertise, that an individual director 
brings to a board or organization. Hillman and colleagues delineate four director 
categories—insiders, business experts, support specialists, and community 
influentials. Business experts are those individuals that provide decision-making 
and control, sounding boards, information sharing, and legitimacy. Directors that 
are current CEOs, former CEOs, and professional directors are classified as 
business experts. Support specialists are technical professionals that provide 
information sharing, access to resources, and legitimacy. Directors with 
backgrounds in accounting, banking, law, and public affairs/marketing are 
classified as support specialist. Community influentials are directors that may 
provide social perspectives, connections to powerful and political relationships, 
other stakeholders, and legitimacy. Individuals who serve as politicians, 
academics, social organization leaders or other non-classified directors are 
classified as community influentials. Each director in my sample is coded into one 
of these categories representing the dominant experience in the individual’s career 
based on information provided by BoardEx. To test the reliability of this coding, I 
also used the IRRC director database to categorize a director’s resource 
dependence roles based on his or her occupational title. IRRC provided a 
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director’s primary job title and other employment title along with his or her 
primary employer name. The IRRC director database only has this information 
available for certain years; however, I was able to use the time window 1998 to 
2001 to examine over 700 director’s primary employment titles and their primary 
employers. Using this data, a director was coded a business expert if his or her 
primary employment title was executive (including CEO, COO, CFO, President, 
Vice-President, etc.) and his or her primary employer was not a financial, 
insurance, or real estate firm. A director was coded a community influential if his 
or her primary title included professor, university administrator, educational 
consultant, editor, private physician, government official, or politician. Finally, a 
director was coded as a support specialist if his or primary employment title 
include consultant, bank executive, lawyer, venture capitalist and their primary 
employer included accounting, consulting, and law firms. I then compared my 
original director categorizations from BoardEx with those coded from the IRRC 
database. This comparison resulted in an 88% match between the coding from the 
directors biographical information from BoardEx and their primary employment 
titles provided in the IRRC database. Then, each of those 89 directors not 
matched was re-examined using a third source (e.g., Who’s Who Directory of 
Corporate America, firm’s proxy statements, and online executive biographies 
from Fortune and BusinessWeek) to determine which categorization best 
represented the individual’s cumulative experience.  
Director Experience. To capture director experience, I examine a 
director’s number of previous directorships and overall number of years serving 
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as a director. Cumulative number of directorships is measured as the lagged 
number of current board appointments at director has at time t-1. Number of years 
serving as a director is measured as the lagged total number of years an 
individual has served as a director on corporate board at time t-1. To capture this 
measure, I took a director’s first year of service on the individual’s first corporate 
board as the beginning time and subtracted that year by year t-1 of the current 
year t.  
Access to Structural Holes. Social Capital is measured using the individual 
director’s network position, in particular the individual’s access to structural 
holes. To capture this dimension of social capital, I measured a director’s network 
position in network of corporate directors in the S&P 1500 from the Riskmetrics 
IRRC director database. To capture this network position measure, I follow Burt’s 
(2000) network perspective of social capital and use the network of all directors in 
the S&P 1500 as the population network of interest for each year from 1996 to 
2006. In particular, to measure a director’s access to structural holes (Burt, 1992), 
I use Burt’s effective size indicator of structural holes. A director’s access to 
structural holes, using the network effective size indicator, provides a measure of 
“the number of alters, weighted by strength of tie, that an ego is directly 
connected to, minus a ‘redundancy’ factor (Borgatti, Jones, & Everett, 1998: 31; 
see also Burt, 1992). This measure was then lagged for each director.  
Moderating Variables 
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Gender. Gender was coded 1 for female and 0 for male directors. I verify 
the gender of directors using BoardEx and biographic information from the Who’s 
Who Directory of Corporate America.  
Previous Board Exit. To capture a measure of a director’s previous board 
mobility, I measure a director’s exit from a board in the previous period. The 
variable is coded as 1 if a director exits any of the individual’s corporate 
directorships in the previous time period (t-1) and 0 otherwise. 
Financial Restatement. Director stigma captures a director serving at a 
firm that has engaged in fraudulent statements and financial misrepresentation 
either as an employee or director. The operationalization of this construct has 
mainly focused on financial statement fraud utilizing financial restatements as a 
proxy for the fraudulent behavior (e.g., O'Connor, Priem, Coombs, & Gilley, 
2006). I employ a binary variable to indicate whether a firm that the individual 
director sits on the board of or works for has restated their financial reports. In 
this case, financial restatement is a lagged dummy that equals one for a director 
that serves on a firm that had to restate financial reports, and zero otherwise. I test 
multiple-time period lags (e.g., t-1, t-2, etc.) to examine the more immediate and 
residual effects of director stigma on the human and social capital-director 
mobility relationships.  
Environmental Dynamism. Environmental dynamism is the degree of 
change and the corresponding uncertainty and turbulence in the environment as a 
result (Dess & Beard, 1984; Sharfman & Dean, 1991; Thompson, 1967). To 
measure dynamism, I used the log-transformation of net sales for each firm in 
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each four-digit SIC code for a series of five-year panels (Boyd, 1995; Keats & 
Hitt, 1988). Then, the actual dynamism measure derived from the exponentiated 
standard errors of the betas from the regress equation regressing net sales on the 
previous five years.  
Control Variables 
 I also control for firm-level factors of their current appointments that, 
while not hypothesized, may potential affect the hypothesized relationships. 
Board conditions may be a major influence oven an individual’s likelihood of 
receiving new board appointments (Fama, 1980; Fich, 2005; Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 1988). In particular, I control for a director’s current boards’ firm size 
and performance. Individuals that serve on larger firms may be seen as having 
more experience in making critical decision or possess critical links to other 
resources. I measure firm size as the logged number of employees. Similarly, 
directors at higher performing firms may be more likely to receive subsequent 
appointments because of the connection to the higher performing firms. I use two 
indicators of firm performance—return on assets (ROA) and Market-to-Book 
ratio, a common indicator of Tobin’s Q. ROA was calculated as net income 
divided by total assets. The market-to-book ratio was calculated as the market 
value of shares divided by book value of shares (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008). 
In each case, I use a director’s largest board seat in terms of performance and size 
to provide the lagged firm size, ROA, Market-to-Book indicators4
                                                 
4 Firm size and performance were also averaged across a director’s boards; 
however, the results were unchanged.  
. When 
different boards represented the largest and best performing boards, I used the 
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values for the higher performing board. While my independent variables derive 
from individual-level characteristics, I also control for director age. Director age 
has been shown to affect the likelihood and type of subsequent appointments a 
director receives (Zajac & Westphal, 1996) and in some cases, boards have a 
mandatory retirement age. Therefore, I control for director age coded in years.  
Analysis 
To test my main effect hypotheses, I use event history analysis (Allison, 
1984) because my central focus is on specific events—board appointments. As 
Yamaguchi (1991: 1) indicates, “Event history analysis is concerned with the 
patterns and correlates of the occurrences of events.” These events are qualitative 
discrete changes in state that proceeds a time internal of nonoccurrence 
(Yamaguchi, 1991). Event history analysis assumes that there are a collective 
group of units moving along a finite set of states (or events) in which these states 
can occur at any point in time and are influenced by time-dependent factors 
(Blossfeld, Golsch, & Rohwer, 2007; Blossfeld & Rohwer, 1997; Coleman, 
1981). In particular, event history analysis is concerned with the amount of time 
that must pass before a specific change in state or event occurs (Poole, Van de 
Ven, Dooley, & Holmes, 2000). This analytic technique models hazard rates 
(Allison, 1984). “The hazard rate (or hazard function), h(t), expresses the 
instantaneous risk of having the event at time t, given that the event did not occur 
before time t. The hazard function h(t) is also defined as the ratio of the 
unconditional instantaneous probability of having the event f(t) divided by the 
survival probability (or survivor function) S(t), which is the probability of not 
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having the event prior to time t. ” (Yamaguchi, 1991: 9-10). Because my main 
interest in these variables is determining the likelihood or rate of occurring events, 
this method is most appropriate. However, because of the multi-episodic nature of 
my data, I use a variant of the Cox proportional hazard approach to event history. 
I use the Anderson-Gill Counting Process model to correct for multiple events 
across a group of individuals (For a review of this method, see Ezell, Land, & 
Cohen, 2003).  
I also follow previous research (Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 2006; Sinha & 
Noble, 2008), by examining an accelerated failure-time model (c.f., Allison, 1997; 
Yamaguchi, 1992) to supplement my hypotheses on the likelihood of joining a 
new board. Just as its name suggests, an accelerated failure-time model captures 
the acceleration or deceleration of time as a result of an event occurring. These 
models are distinct from the Cox proportional hazard models. As Yamaguchi 
provides (1992: 284), “Unlike proportional hazards models, accelerated failure-
time models assume that high/low hazard rates result solely from acceleration/ 
deceleration in the timing of the event.”  
In this regard, an accelerated failure-time model provides a unique 
interpretation of the event occurrence. The coefficients from this model represent 
time ratios, which represent the log of time until an event occurs. An accelerated 
failure-time model is very similar in form to ordinary linear regression, where the 
model takes the form: log Ti = β0 + β1xi1 + ··· + βkxik + σεi and εi represents a 
random error term and β1,…, βk and σ are parameters to be estimated ( Allison, 
1997). A distribution is then specified for this model. I follow Hillman and 
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colleagues’ (2002) approach and utilize an exponential distribution. This model 
allows for an interpretation of the coefficient that reflects a change in the log Ti, 
or in other words, the acceleration or deceleration of time. From this 
interpretation, every change in xi represents an increase (or decrease) in the rate at 
which an event occurs (Sinha & Noble, 2008).  
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Chapter 5 
RESULTS 
Means and correlations appear in Table 2. The means and standard 
deviations are within expectations. To examine whether multicollinearity was a 
concern, I computed variance inflation factors (VIFs) for each of my models. 
Using ordinary least squares regression for each model, all VIFs were well below 
the guideline of 10 (c.f., Chatterjee & Price, 1991).  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------- 
The coefficients in each in the following tables represent either hazard 
ratios for the entry and exit hypotheses or time ratios for the supplementary tests. 
Hazard ratios represent the increase in likelihood of an event’s occurrence with a 
one-unit increase in the independent variable. From this interpretation, a hazard 
ratio of 1 indicates no effect. Hazard ratios that are greater than one indicate a 
positive relationship (every unit increase in the independent variables increases 
the likelihood that the event will occur) and hazard ratios of less than 1 indicate 
negative relationships (every unit increase in the independent variables decreases 
the likelihood that the event will occur). Time ratios represent the log of time until 
an event occurs, and, thus, smaller time ratios would indicate faster rates of an 
event occurring. In this regard, a time ratios that are less than 1 indicate positive 
relationships (every unit increase in the independent variables increases the rate at 
which the event will occur), and time ratios greater than 1 indicate a negative 
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relationships (every unit increase in the independent variables decreases the rate a 
which the event will occur).  
 
Main Effect Hypotheses 
Likelihood of Joining a New Board  
Models 1 and 2 of Table 3 present the results of the hypothesis test for the 
likelihood of joining a new board. The dependent variable is the likelihood of 
joining a new board, and control variables include director age, the director’s best 
performing board (Max ROA and Max Market-to-Book) and the largest firm size 
(Max Firm Size). Of these control variables, Director Age (hr=0.951; p<.001) and 
largest firm size (hr=1.332; p<.01) were significant; whereas, the performance 
indicators, Max ROA (hr=1.087; n.s.) and Max Market-to-Book (hr=0.998; n.s.) 
were insignificant. Interpreting the significant hazard ratios indicates that each 
unit change in Director Age decreases the likelihood of joining a board by 4.9% 
(1.000 – 0.951=.049) and each unit change in firm size increases the likelihood of 
joining a board by 32.2% for every unit change in firm size (1.322-1.000=.322). 
Hypothesis 1a predicted that higher levels of education will lead to a 
higher likelihood of joining a new board. However, the coefficients in Model 2 
for Advanced Degree (hr=0.94; n.s.) and Educational Prestige (hr=1.104; n.s.) 
were insignificant. Thus, there was no support for the impact of educational level 
on the likelihood of joining a new board.  
Hypothesis 1b predicted that directors who are business experts are more 
likely to join a new board compared to community influentials or support 
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specialists. In support of hypothesis 1b, the coefficient for business expert is 
greater than 1 and significant (hr=1.426; p<.05). Interpreting the hazard ratio, we 
can see that outside directors that are business experts are 42.6% more likely than 
community influentials to join a new board (1.426-1.000=.426). To test the 
difference between business experts and support specialists, I reran model 3 but 
with support specialists rather than community influentials excluded (or as the 
comparable group). In these results, the coefficient for business expert was again 
greater than 1 and significant (hr=1.289; p<.1) suggesting that business experts 
are 28.9% more likely to join a new board than support specialists. Therefore, I 
find support for the impact of business expertise on the likelihood of joining a 
new board. 
Hypothesis 1c suggests that directors with higher director experience will 
be more likely to join a new board. The coefficient for Director Experience is less 
than 1 and non-significant (hr=0.987; n.s.). Furthermore, the lagged cumulative 
number of appointments is less than 1 and significant (hr=0.787; p<.001). This 
result suggests that for each unit change in a director’s cumulative number 
directorships, his or she is 22.3% less likely to join a new board (1.000-
0.787=.223). However, this relationship is in the opposite direction from the 
proposed hypothesis. Thus, results taken together, these results suggest that there 
is no association between director experience and the likelihood of join a new 
board.  
Hypothesis 1d hypothesizes that directors with access to more structural 
holes will be more likely to join a new board. The coefficient for a director’s 
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lagged effective network size is greater than 1 and significant (hr=1.051; p<.001). 
Interpreting the hazard ratio, for every unit change in network effective size, an 
outside director is 5.2% more likely to join a board (1.051-1.000=.051). Thus, I 
find support for Hypothesis 1d.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Supplementary analysis of joining a new board 
Models 3 and 4 in Table 3 present the results of the hypotheses tests for 
the rate of joining a new board. As previously mentioned, the coefficients for the 
hypotheses regarding this supplementary analysis represent time ratios. Here 
again, the control variables entered into the first step included individual-level 
factor, director age, and the director’s board with the largest Market-to-Book 
ratio, ROA, and Firm Size. In this particular model, Director Age (tr=1.059; 
p<.001) and Max Firm Size (tr=0.753; p<.001) were significant; whereas, the 
performance indicators, Max ROA (tr=0.825; n.s.) and Max Market-to-Book 
(hr=0.753; n.s.) were insignificant. Interpreting the significant time ratios indicate 
that each unit change in Director Age increases the time between joining a new 
board by 5.9% (1.059-1.000=.059) and each unit change in firm size decreases the 
time between appointments by 17.5% (1.000-0.825=.175). Thus, as directors age, 
they are less likely to garner appointments at a faster rate; however, those 
directors sitting on the boards of larger firms do receive appointments at a faster 
rate than those directors that sit on the boards of smaller firms.  
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Hypothesis 1a predicted that higher levels of education increase the rate at 
which a director joins a new board. Here again, the coefficient for Advanced 
Degree (tr=1.057; n.s.) and Educational Prestige (tr=0.901; n.s.) were 
insignificant. Thus, there was no support for the impact of educational level on a 
director’s rate of joining a new board.  
In support of hypothesis 1b, the coefficient for business expert is greater 
than 1 and significant (tr=0.724; p<.05). In this case, business experts obtain new 
appointments at a 27.6% faster rate than community influentials (1.000-
0.724=.276). Again, to test the difference between business experts and support 
specialists, I reran model 4 with support specialists as the comparison group. The 
coefficient for business expert is less than 1 and significant (tr=0.793; p<.10). In 
this case, business experts obtain new appointments at a 20.7% faster than 
community influentials (1.000-0.793=.207). Therefore, I find support for the 
impact of business expertise on the rate of joining a new board.  
The coefficient for director experience (tr=1.016; p<.10) and cumulative 
number of directorships (tr=1.271; p<.001) is greater than 1 and significant albeit 
marginally significant for director experience. Interpreting these time ratios 
suggest that for every unit change in director experience and the cumulative 
number of directors, directors join new appointments at 1.6% and 27.1% slower 
time periods, respectively. However, these results are in the opposite direction of 
the hypothesized relationship meaning that the greater an individual’s experience 
as a director, the slower they are to join other boards; thus, these results provide 
no support for hypothesis 1c.  
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Finally, the coefficient for a director’s lagged effective network size is less 
than 1 and significant (tr=0.952; p<.001). Interpreting the time ratio, for every 
unit change in network effective size, an outside director joins a new board at a 
4.8% faster rate (1.000-0.952=.048). Thus, the coefficient for effective network 
size is in the proposed direction and significant offering support for hypothesis 
1d.  
Joining a Prestigious Board 
Hypotheses 2a-d consider the relationship between human and social 
capital indicators and the likelihood of joining a Fortune 100 firm. The results of 
these hypotheses are presented in Models 5 and 6 in Table 3. The coefficients for 
these hypotheses are hazard rates. Here again, the control variables, Director Age 
(hr=0.948; p<.001) and max firm size (hr=1.456; p<.001); however, Max Market-
to-Book (hr=1.001; n.s.) and Max ROA (hr=4.252; n.s.) were insignificant. 
Interpreting the significant hazard ratios indicates that each unit change in 
Director Age decreases the likelihood of joining a Fortune 100 board by 5.2% 
(1.000 – 0.948=.052) and each unit change in firm size increases the likelihood of 
joining a Fortune 100 board by 45.6% for every unit change in firm size (1.456-
1.000=.456). 
Hypothesis 2a predicted that a director with higher levels of education has 
an increased likelihood of joining a new Fortune 100 board. Much like the 
likelihood of joining any board, the coefficient in Model 6 for Advanced Degree 
(hr=0.887; n.s.) and Educational Prestige (hr=1.292; n.s.) were insignificant. 
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Thus, there was no support for the impact of educational level on the likelihood of 
joining a new Fortune 100 board.  
Hypothesis 2b suggests that business experts are more likely than 
community influentials or support specialists to join a new Fortune 100 board. 
The coefficient for business expert is greater than 1 (hr=1.197; n.s.); however, the 
coefficient for this hazard rate is insignificant. Thus, I fail to find support for 
Hypothesis 2b.  
Hypothesis 2c suggests that an individual with higher director experience 
will be more likely to join a Fortune 100 board. The coefficient for Director 
Experience is greater than 1, but it is non-significant (hr=1.002; n.s.). The lagged 
cumulative number of appointments is less than 1 and significant (hr=0.782; 
p<.001); however, the direction of the coefficient is in the opposite direction of 
the hypothesize relationship. Therefore, I find no support for the relationship 
director experience and the likelihood of join a new Fortune 100 board.  
Hypothesis 2d hypothesizes that directors with more access to structural 
holes will be more likely to join a Fortune 100 board. The coefficient for a 
director’s lagged effective network size is greater than 1 and significant 
(hr=1.047; p<.001). In this case, for every unit change in network effective size, a 
director is 4.7% more likely to join a Fortune 100 board (1.047-1.000=.047) than 
those directors with less access to structural holes. 
Likelihood of Exiting a Current Board  
Hypotheses 3a-d examine the relationship between human and social 
capital and director exit. Models 7 and 8 in Table 3 provide the evidence on these 
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hypotheses. In terms of control variables, Director Age (hr=1.044; p<.001) and 
Max Firm Size (hr=1.561; p<.001) are positive and significant. For these 
variables, an increase in Director Age relates to a 4.4% in the likelihood of exiting 
a board in that particular year. Similarly, a unit change in a director’s max firm 
size relates to a 56.1% in the likelihood of exiting a focal board. Max ROA 
(hr=2.171; n.s.) and Max Market-to-Book (hr=1.000; n.s.) are insignificant in 
Model 7.  
Hypothesis 3a predicted that a director with higher levels of education has 
an increased likelihood of exiting a current board. The coefficients in Model 8 for 
Advanced Degree (hr=1.009; n.s.) is in the predicted direction while Educational 
Prestige (hr=0.990; n.s.) is not; however, neither of these coefficients are 
significant. Thus, I find no support for Hypothesis 3a.  
Hypothesis 3b suggests that business experts are more likely than 
community influentials or support specialists to exit a current board. The 
coefficient for business expert is greater than 1 as predicted (hr=1.019; n.s.) but 
insignificant. Business experts are no less likely to exit a board than a support 
specialist or community influential. Thus, these results offer no support for 
Hypothesis 3b.  
Hypothesis 3c proposes that directors with higher director experience will 
be more likely to exit a current board. The coefficient for Director Experience is 
less than 1, but it is non-significant (hr=0.998; n.s.). The lagged cumulative 
number of appointments is greater than 1 and significant (hr=1.208; p<.001). 
Interpreting this hazard ratio suggests that for every unit change in the cumulative 
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number of directorships, a director is 20.8% more likely to exit a board. 
Therefore, I find partial support for the relationship between director experience 
and the likelihood of exiting a board.  
Hypothesis 3d suggests that directors with more access to structural holes 
will be more likely to exit a current board. The coefficient for a director’s lagged 
effective network size is greater than 1 and significant (hr=1.010; p<.001) 
suggesting that for each unit change in a director’s effective network size, a 
director is 1% more likely to exit a current board. Therefore, I find support for 
hypothesis 3d.  
Moderating Hypotheses 
To test the moderating hypotheses 4-7, I regressed the dependent variable 
of interest on the independent and moderator variables in Table 3. After this step, 
the dependent variable was regressed on the cross-product terms between the 
moderators and the main independent variables (i.e., Advanced Degree, 
Educational Prestige, Business Expert, Community Influential, Director 
Experience, Cumulative Directorships, and Effective Network Size). Each of the 
continuous variables were mean-centered to reduce the possibility of 
multicollinearity (Aguinis & Gottfredson, 2010). Each of the moderating 
variables also is included in all models to provide the most conservative test of the 
moderating effects. These results are reported in the Tables 4 through 7.  
Gender 
Hypotheses 4a-c propose a positive moderating effect of gender on the 
relationship between human and social capital and subsequent board 
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appointments and exit. Specifically, Hypothesis 4a suggests that director with 
higher levels of education, expertise, director experience, and access to structural 
holes that are also female are more likely to join new boards than their male 
counterparts. The main effects for this hypothesis are reported in Model 2 in 
Table 3. The moderator variable, Gender, is insignificant (hr=0.822; n.s.) in the 
presence of the independent variables and the other moderating variables. The 
tests of the interactions are reported in Models 9 in Table 4. The interaction term 
Gender × Director Experience is greater than one and significant (hr=1.073; 
p<.05) suggesting that directors with higher levels of director experience that are 
female are 7.3% more likely to join a new board (1.073-1.000=.073). The 
interaction term Gender × Cumulative Directorships is also significant but in the 
opposite direction of the proposed relationship (hr=0.718; p<.05). Finally, the 
interaction terms for Gender × Advanced Degree (hr=0.892; n.s.), Gender × 
Educational Prestige (hr=1.576; n.s.), Gender × Business Expert (hr=0.985; n.s.), 
Gender × Support Specialist (hr=1.046; n.s.), and Gender × Effective Network 
Size (hr=1.016; n.s.) are insignificant. Additionally, the model chi-square 
including only these interaction terms in Model 9 is insignificant (Wald Chi-
Square = 9.36; n.s.). Overall, the results provide no support for hypothesis 4a.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------- 
I next reexamine hypothesis 4a utilizing an accelerated failure-time model. 
The main effects for this hypothesis are reported in Model 4 in Table 3. The 
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coefficients for this analysis are time ratios. The moderator variable, Gender, is 
insignificant (tr=1.230; n.s.) in the presence of the independent variables and the 
other moderating variables. The test of the interactions is reported in Model 10 in 
Table 4. The interaction term Gender × Director Experience is less than one and 
significant (tr=0.938; p<.05) suggesting that directors with higher levels of 
director experience that are female join new boards at 7.3% faster rate than their 
male counterparts with similar levels of director experience (1.073-1.000=073). 
The product-term The Gender × Cumulative Directorships is significant at the 0.1 
level but in the opposite direction of the proposed relationship (tr=1.349; p<.10). 
Finally, the cross-product terms for Gender × Advanced Degree (tr=1.0890; n.s.), 
Gender × Educational Prestige (tr=0.661; n.s.), Gender × Business Expert 
(tr=1.068; n.s.), Gender × Support Specialists (tr=0.950; n.s.), and Gender × 
Effective Network Size (tr=0.986; n.s.), are insignificant. The model the model 
chi-square including only these interaction terms in model 10 is insignificant 
(Wald Chi-Square = 8.890; n.s.). From this analysis, I also find no support for 
hypothesis 4a.  
Hypothesis 4b suggests that female directors that are business experts with 
higher levels of educational and director experience and greater access to 
structural holes are more likely to join a new Fortune 100 board relative to male 
directors. The main effects for this hypothesis are reported in Model 6 in Table 3. 
The moderator variable, Gender, is marginally significant (hr=0.608; p<.10.) in 
the presence of the independent variables and the other moderating variables. This 
coefficient suggests that female directors are 39.2% less likely to join a Fortune 
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100 board relative to their male counterparts. The test of the interactions is 
reported in Model 11 in Table 4. The interaction term Gender × Educational 
Prestige is greater than one and significant at the 0.1 level (hr=3.349; p<.1) 
suggest that female directors that attained a prestigious educational institution are 
3.45 times more likely to join a new Fortune 100 board than their male 
counterparts. The interaction term Gender × Cumulative Directorships is 
significant at the 0.1 level but less than one (hr=0.636; p<.1) and thus not in the 
hypothesized direction. Finally, the cross-product terms for Gender × Advanced 
Degree (hr=0.953; n.s.), Gender × Business Expert (hr=0.919; n.s.), Gender × 
Support Specialists (hr=0.936; n.s.), Gender × Director Experience (hr=1.082; 
n.s.) and Gender × Effective Network Size (hr=1.030; n.s.) are insignificant. 
Furthermore, the model the model chi-square including only these interaction 
terms in Model 11 is insignificant (Wald Chi-Square = 6.95; n.s.). Overall, the 
results provide no support for hypothesis 4b. 
Hypothesis 4c proposes that directors with higher levels of the human and 
social capital components that are female are more likely to exit a current board 
seat relative to male directors. The main effects for this hypothesis are reported in 
Model 8 in Table 3. The moderator variable, Gender, is insignificant (hr=1.114; 
n.s.) in the presence of the independent variables and the other moderating 
variables. The test of the interactions is reported in Model 12 in Table 4. In this 
case none of the interaction terms are significant and the model the model chi-
square including only these interaction terms in Model 12 is also insignificant 
(Wald Chi-Square = 9.71; n.s.). Thus, I find no support for hypothesis 4c.  
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Previous Board Exit 
 Hypotheses 5a-c propose a positive moderating effect for previous board 
departures on the relationship between human and social capital and the 
likelihood of joining a new board and exiting a current board. Hypothesis 5a 
proposes that a director’s previous departure from a current board will positively 
moderate the relationship between director education, expertise, experience and 
access to structural holes and subsequent board appointments such that directors 
departing from a previous board will be more likely to join a new board. The main 
effects for this hypothesis are reported in Model 2 in Table 3. The moderator 
variable, Previous Board Departure, is significant (hr=2.196; p<.001) in the 
presence of the independent variables and the other moderating variables. This 
coefficient is greater than one suggesting that directors departing a current board 
seat at time t-1 are 2.2 times more likely to join a new board at time t. The tests of 
the interactions are reported in Models 13 in Table 5. The cross-product terms for 
Departure × Advanced Degree (hr=1.157; n.s.), Departure × Educational Prestige 
(hr=1.230; n.s.), Departure × Business Expert (hr=0.718; n.s.), Departure × 
Support Specialists (hr=0.630; n.s.), Departure × Director Experience (hr=1.014; 
n.s.), Departure × Cumulative Directorships (hr=0.969; n.s.), and Departure × 
Effective Network Size (hr=0.991; n.s.) are all insignificant. Overall, the model 
chi-square including only these interaction terms in Model 13 is insignificant 
(Wald Chi-Square = 9.84; n.s.) suggesting that a director’s departure from a 
previous board does not affect the relationship between human and social capital 
and likelihood of joining a new board. Thus, I find no support for hypothesis 5a.  
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---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
---------------------------------- 
To further analyze Hypothesis 5a, I examine this hypothesis using an 
accelerated failure-time model. The coefficients for this supplemental analysis are 
time ratios. The main effects for this hypothesis are reported in Model 4 in Table 
3. The moderator variable, Previous Board Departure, is significant (tr=0.475; 
p<.001) in the presence of the independent variables and the other moderating 
variables. This result suggests that directors departing a current board in the 
previous period join new boards at a 52.5% faster rate than directors not departing 
a current board in the previous period (1.000-0.475=.525). The test of the 
interactions is reported in Model 14 in Table 5. The cross-product terms for 
Departure × Advanced Degree (tr=0.875; n.s.), Departure × Educational Prestige 
(tr=0.839; n.s.), Departure × Business Expert (tr=1.379; n.s.), Departure × 
Support Specialists (tr=1.590; n.s.), Departure × Director Experience (tr=0.988; 
n.s.), Departure × Cumulative Directorships (tr=1.005; n.s.), and Departure × 
Effective Network Size (tr=1.012; n.s.), are all insignificant. The model chi-
square including only these interaction terms in Model 14 is insignificant (Wald 
Chi-Square = 11.16; p<.1) providing no support for the moderating role of 
departing a board in the previous period. Taken together, these results further 
provide no support for hypothesis 5a.  
Hypothesis 5b suggests that directors with higher levels of education, 
business expertise, director experience, and access to structural holes will be more 
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likely to join a new Fortune 100 board in the current period when they depart 
from a board in the previous period. The main effects for this hypothesis are 
reported in Model 6 in Table 3. The moderator variable, Departure, is significant 
(hr=2.926; p<.001) in the presence of the independent variables and the other 
moderating variables suggesting that directors departing a current board seat in 
the previous time period are 2.9 times more likely to join a Fortune 100 board in 
the current time period. The test of the interactions is reported in Model 15 in 
Table 5. The interaction term Departure × Business Expert is less than one and 
significant (hr=0.379; p<.05) suggesting that business experts who depart from a 
board in the previous period are less likely to join a Fortune 100 board than 
community influentials who similarly depart from a board in the previous period. 
The interaction term Departure × Support Specialists is also significant and less 
than one (hr=0.344; p<.05) suggesting that, similar to business experts, support 
specialists who depart from a current board in the previous period are less likely 
to join a Fortune 100 board than community influentials. However, both of these 
coefficients are in the opposite direction of the predicted hypotheses. The 
interaction terms for Departure × Advanced Degree (hr=1.050; n.s.), Departure × 
Educational Prestige (hr=1.234; n.s.), Departure × Director Experience (hr=1.000; 
n.s.), Departure × Cumulative Directorships (hr=0.921; n.s.), and Departure × 
Effective Network Size (hr=0.990; n.s.), are all insignificant. The model chi-
square including only these interaction terms in Model 15 is significant (Wald 
Chi-Square = 16.09; p<.05). However, again, the significant coefficients are in the 
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opposite direction of the proposed moderating relationship. Therefore, I find no 
support for Hypothesis 5b. 
Hypothesis 5c proposes that a director with higher levels of the human and 
social capital will be less likely to exit a current board when departing from 
another board in the previous period. The main effects for this hypothesis are 
reported in Model 8 in Table 3. The moderator variable, Departure, is significant 
and less than (hr=0.641; p<.001) in the presence of the independent variables and 
the other moderating variables. This suggests that a director exiting a board in the 
previous period is 35.9% less likely to exit a board in the current period. The test 
of the interactions is reported in Model 16 in Table 5. The interaction terms for 
Departure × Advanced Degree (hr=1.206; n.s.), Departure × Educational Prestige 
(hr=1.162; n.s.), Departure × Business Expert (hr=1.179; n.s.), Departure × 
Support Specialists (hr=0.803; n.s.), Departure × Director Experience (hr=1.012; 
n.s.), Departure × Cumulative Directorships (hr=0.985; n.s.), and Departure × 
Network Size (hr=1.007) are all insignificant. The model chi-square including 
only these interaction terms in Model 16 is insignificant (Wald Chi-Square = 
9.25; n.s.). Thus, I find no support for hypothesis 5c.  
Financial Restatement 
Hypothesis 6a proposes that a director with higher levels of education, 
business expertise, director experience, and access to structural holes will be less 
likely to join a new board when the directors is sitting on a board experiencing a 
restatement in periods t, t-1, and t-2. The main effects for this hypothesis are 
reported in Model 2 in Table 3. The moderator variable, Restatement, is 
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insignificant (hr=1.140; n.s.) in the presence of the independent variables and the 
other moderating variables. The tests of the interactions are reported in Models 17 
in Table 6. The interaction term Restatement × Educational Prestige is less than 
one and significant at the 0.1 level (hr=0.589; p<.1) suggesting that directors who 
attained a prestigious educational institution are 41.1% less likely to join a new 
board when sitting on a board that experienced a restatement in the previous 
periods (1.000-0.589=.411). Similarly, the interaction term for Restatement × 
Effective Network Size is less than one and significant (hr=0.977; p<.05). The 
interpretation of this interaction term’s hazard rate suggests that for every unit 
change in a director’s effective network size decrease the likelihood of joining a 
new board by 2.3% when the director is currently sitting on a board that 
experienced a restatement in the previous periods (1.000-0.9770=.023). The 
interaction terms for Restatement × Advanced Degree (hr=1.742; n.s.), 
Restatement × Business Expert (hr=0.907; n.s.), Restatement × Support 
Specialists (hr=0.794; n.s.), Restatement × Director Experience (hr=1.015; n.s.), 
and Restatement × Cumulative Directorships (hr=1.039; n.s.) are insignificant. 
Overall, the model chi-square including only these interaction terms in Model 17 
is significant (Wald Chi-Square = 13.99; p<.10). Thus, I find partial support for 
hypothesis 6a.  
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---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
---------------------------------- 
To further examine Hypothesis 6a, I use an accelerated failure-time model 
to examine whether a director with higher levels of education, business expertise, 
director experience, and access to structural holes join a new boards at a slower 
rate when the directors is sitting on a board experiencing a restatement in periods 
t, t-1, and t-2. The coefficients for this analysis test are time ratios. The main 
effects for this hypothesis are reported in Model 4 in Table 3. The moderator 
variable, Restatement, is insignificant (tr=0.906; n.s.) in the presence of the 
independent variables and the other moderating variables. The interaction term 
Restatement × Educational Prestige is greater than one and significant (tr=1.781; 
p<.05) suggesting that directors who attained a prestigious educational institution 
join new boards at a 78.1% slower rate when sitting on a board that experienced a 
restatement in the previous periods (1.781-1.000=.817). The interaction term for 
Restatement × Effective Network Size is greater than one and significant 
(tr=1.017; p<.10). The interpretation of this interaction term’s hazard rate 
suggests that for every unit change in a director’s effective network size decrease 
the rate of joining a new board by 1.7% when the director is currently sitting on a 
board that experienced a restatement in the previous periods (1.017-1.000=.017). 
The interaction terms for Restatement × Advanced Degree (tr=0.606; n.s.), 
Restatement × Business Expert (tr=1.204; n.s.), Restatement × Support Specialist 
(tr=1.432; n.s.), Restatement × Director Experience (tr=0.991; n.s.), and 
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Restatement × Cumulative Directorships (tr=0.995; n.s.). Overall, the model chi-
square including only these interaction terms in Model 18 is significant (Wald 
Chi-Square = 12.80; p<.05). Thus, I again find some support for hypothesis 6a 
using the accelerated failure-time model. 
Hypothesis 6b suggests that directors that are business experts with higher 
levels of education and director experience and greater access to structural holes 
will be likely to join a new Fortune 100 board in the current period when sitting 
on a board experiencing a restatement in periods t, t-1, and t-2. The main effects 
for this hypothesis are reported in Model 6 in Table 3. The moderator variable, 
Restatement, is insignificant (hr=0.964; n.s.) in the presence of the independent 
variables and the other moderating variables. The test of the interactions is 
reported in Model 19 in Table 6. Similar to the likelihood to join any new board, 
the interaction term Restatement × Educational Prestige is less than one and 
significant (hr=0.344; p<.05) suggesting that directors who attained a prestigious 
educational institution are 65.6% less likely to join a new Fortune 100 board 
when sitting on a board that experienced a restatement in the previous periods 
(1.000-0.344=.656). The interaction term for Restatement × Effective Network 
Size also is less than one and significant (hr=0.936; p<.001) suggesting that every 
unit change in a director’s effective network size corresponds to a 6.4% decrease 
in likelihood of joining a Fortune 100 board when the director is currently sitting 
on a board that experienced a restatement in the previous periods (1.000-
0.936=.064). The interaction terms for Restatement × Advanced Degree 
(hr=1.670; n.s.), Restatement × Business Expert (hr=1.062; n.s.), Restatement × 
   92 
Support Specialist (hr=0.641; n.s.), Restatement × Director Experience (hr=1.017; 
n.s.), and Restatement × Cumulative Directorships (hr=1.315; n.s.) are 
insignificant. Overall, the model chi-square including only these interaction terms 
in Model 19 is significant (Wald Chi-Square = 18.27; p<.05). Thus, I find partial 
support for hypothesis 6b.  
Hypothesis 6c hypothesizes that a director with higher levels of the human 
and social capital are more likely to exit a current board when sitting on a board 
experiencing a restatement in periods t, t-1, and t-2. The main effects for this 
hypothesis are reported in Model 8 in Table 3. The moderator variable, 
Restatement, is insignificant (hr=1.090; n.s.) in the presence of the independent 
variables and the other moderating variables. The test of the interactions is 
reported in Model 20 in Table 6. For this particular hypothesis, only the 
interaction term for Restatement × Educational Prestige is greater than one and 
significant (hr=1.430; p<.05). This significant coefficient suggests that directors 
who attained a prestigious educational institution are 43.0% more likely to exit a 
current board when sitting on a board that experienced a restatement in the 
previous periods (1.430-1.000=.430). The interaction terms for Restatement × 
Advanced Degree (hr=0.947; n.s.), Restatement × Business Expert (hr=0.746; 
n.s.), Restatement × Support Specialist (hr=1.053; n.s.), Restatement × Director 
Experience (hr=0.986; n.s.), Restatement × Cumulative Directorships (hr=0.967; 
n.s.), and Restatement × Network Size (hr=0.994; n.s.) are insignificant. Overall, 
the model chi-square including only these interaction terms in Model 20 is 
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significant (Wald Chi-Square = 15.91; p<.05). Therefore, I find partial support for 
hypothesis 6c.  
Environmental Dynamism 
Hypothesis 7a proposes that a director with higher levels of education, 
business expertise, director experience, and access to structural holes will be less 
likely to join a new board when the directors is sitting on other boards that face, 
on average, more dynamic environments. The main effects for this hypothesis are 
reported in Model 2 in Table 3. The moderator variable, Average Dynamism, is 
significant (hr=0.483; p<.01) in the presence of the independent variables and the 
other moderating variables. The coefficient for Average Dynamism suggests that 
directors sitting on boards with higher levels of environmental dynamism are 
51.7% less likely to join a new board (1.000-0.483=.517).  
The tests of the interactions are reported in Models 21 in Table 7. The 
interaction term Average Dynamism × Educational Prestige (hr=1.914.; p<.1) and 
Avg. Dynamism × Director Experience (hr=1.054; p<.1) are significant at the 0.1 
level of significance but their hazard ratio values are greater than one. Thus, the 
coefficients for these interactions are in the opposite direction of the proposed 
relationship. Conversely, the interaction terms for Average Dynamism × 
Cumulative Directorships (hr=0.679; p<.05) and Average Dynamism × Effective 
Network Size (hr=0.931; p<.001) are less than one and significant. For 
cumulative number of directorship, the interpretation of interaction term’s hazard 
rate suggests that for every unit increase in the cumulative number of 
directorships decrease the likelihood of joining a new board by 32.1% when the 
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director is currently sitting on boards facing higher levels of environmental 
dynamism (1.000-0.679=.321). For network size, the interpretation of this 
interaction term’s hazard rate suggests that for every unit increase in a director’s 
effective network size the likelihood of joining a new board decreases by 6.9% 
when the director is currently sitting on boards facing higher levels of 
environmental dynamism (1.000-0.931=.069). The interaction terms for Average 
Dynamism × Advanced Degree (hr=1.072; n.s.), Average Dynamism × Business 
Expert (hr=1.577; n.s.), and Average Dynamism × Support Specialist (hr=0.812; 
n.s.) are insignificant. Overall, the model chi-square including only these 
interaction terms in Model 21 is significant (Wald Chi-Square = 19.78; p<.01). 
Thus, I find partial support for Hypothesis 7a.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
---------------------------------- 
To further analyze Hypothesis 7a, I examine this hypothesis using an 
accelerated failure-time model. The coefficients for this analysis are time ratios. 
The main effects for this hypothesis are reported in Model 4 in Table 3. The 
moderator variable, Average Dynamism, is significant (tr=1.910; p<.05) in the 
presence of the independent variables and the other moderating variables. This 
result suggests that directors sitting on boards with higher levels of environmental 
dynamism join new boards at a 91% slower rate than directors not departing a 
current board in the previous period (1.910-1.000=.910).  
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The tests of the interactions are reported in Models 22 in Table 7. Here 
again, the interaction term Average Dynamism × Educational Prestige (tr=0.530; 
p<.1) and Avg. Dynamism × Director Experience (tr=0.954; p<.1) are significant 
but their time ratio values are less than one. Thus, the coefficients for these 
interactions are in the opposite direction of the proposed relationship. The 
interaction term for Average Dynamism × Cumulative Directorships (tr=1.415; 
p<.05) is greater than one and significant suggesting that every additional 
cumulative board appointment the rate of joining a new board decreases by 41.5% 
when the director is currently sitting on boards facing higher levels of 
environmental dynamism (1.415-1.000=.415). Similarly, the Average Dynamism 
× Effective Network Size (tr=1.077; p<.001) is less than one and significant 
suggesting that every unit increase in a director’s effective network size 
corresponds to a decrease in the rate of joining a new board by 7.7% when the 
director is currently sitting on boards facing higher levels of environmental 
dynamism (1.077-1.000=.077). The interaction terms for Average Dynamism × 
Advanced Degree (tr=0.924; n.s.), Average Dynamism × Business Expert 
(tr=0.613; n.s.), and Average Dynamism × Support Specialist (tr=1.157; n.s.) are 
insignificant. Overall, the model chi-square including only these interaction terms 
in Model 22 is significant (Wald Chi-Square = 22.87; p<.001). Thus, I find partial 
support for Hypothesis 7b. 
Hypothesis 7b proposes that a director with higher levels of education, 
business expertise, director experience, and access to structural holes will be less 
likely to join a new Fortune 100 board in the current period when the average 
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environmental dynamism of his or her current boards is higher. The main effects 
for this hypothesis are reported in Model 6 in Table 3. The moderator variable, 
Average Dynamism, is significant (hr=0.380; p<.05) in the presence of the 
independent variables and the other moderating variables. This coefficient’s value 
suggests that directors sitting on boards with higher levels of environmental 
dynamism are 62.0% less likely to join a join a Fortune 100 board (1.000-
0.380=.620). 
The test of the interactions is reported in Model 23 in Table 7. The 
interaction term for Average Dynamism × Effective Network Size (hr=0.915; 
p<.001) significant and less than one suggesting that for every unit increase in a 
director’s effective network size decrease the likelihood of joining a Fortune 100 
board by 8.5% when the director is currently sitting on boards facing higher levels 
of environmental dynamism (1.000-0. 915=.085). The interaction terms for 
Average Dynamism × Advanced Degree (hr=0.952; n.s.), Average Dynamism × 
Educational Prestige (hr=2.841; n.s.), Average Dynamism × Business Expert 
(hr=1.667; n.s.), Average Dynamism × Support Specialist (hr=0.348; n.s.), 
Average Dynamism × Director Experience (hr=1.063; n.s.), and Average 
Dynamism × Cumulative Directorships (hr=1.047; n.s.) are insignificant. The 
model chi-square including only these interaction terms in Model 23 is significant 
(Wald Chi-Square = 15.09; p<.05). Thus, I find partial support for Hypothesis 7b.  
Hypothesis 7c hypothesizes that a director with higher levels of education, 
business expertise, director experience, and access to structural holes will be more 
likely to exit a current board when the directors is sitting on other boards that 
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face, on average, more dynamic environments. The main effects for this 
hypothesis are reported in Model 8 in Table 3. The moderator variable, Average 
Dynamism, is significant (hr=23.281; p<.001) in the presence of the independent 
variables and the other moderating variables suggesting that directors sitting on 
boards with higher levels of environmental dynamism are 22.28 times more likely 
to exit a current board (23.281 -1.000=22.281). 
The test of the interactions is reported in Model 24 in Table 7. For this 
particular hypothesis, the interaction terms for Average Dynamism × Cumulative 
Directorships (hr=0.709; p<.01) and Average Dynamism × Effective Network 
Size (hr=0.860; p<.01) are significant but their hazard ratio values are less than 
one. Thus, the coefficients for these interactions are in the opposite direction of 
the proposed relationship. The coefficient for the interaction term Average 
Dynamism × Advanced Degree (hr=9.953; p<.1) is in the proposed direction but 
is only significant at a 0.1 level of significance. The interaction terms for Average 
Dynamism × Educational Prestige (hr=1.170; n.s.), Average Dynamism × 
Business Expert (hr=0.356; n.s.), Average Dynamism × Support Specialist 
(hr=0.787; n.s.), and Average Dynamism × Director Experience (hr=1.039; n.s.) 
are insignificant. Overall, the model chi-square including only these interaction 
terms in Model 24 is significant (Wald Chi-Square = 20.26; p<.01); however, 
because the interaction term for Avg. Dynamism × Adv. Degree is only 
significant at a 0.1 level, I find little support for Hypothesis 7c.  
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Chapter 6 
DISCUSSION 
In this study, I examined several dimensions of the director mobility 
outcome that may be important to director’s ability to perform the board 
functions. In particular, I have suggested three dimensions of director mobility—
likelihood of joining a new board, the prestige of the appointment, and the 
likelihood of exiting a current board. In addition, I have integrated human and 
social capital perspectives to hypothesize individual-level determinants of director 
mobility. In this chapter, I interpret the findings from my empirical testing of 
these hypotheses. I conclude with a discussion of the limitations of this study and 
offer guidelines for future research on director selection.  
 
Discussion of Results 
Control Variables 
In testing my proposed research model, I have included four control 
variables—one director level variable, director age, and three firm-level 
characteristics of the boards a director currently sit upon, including Firm Size 
(measured as the log of the number employees), Market-to-Book, and ROA. For 
the firm-level variables, I used the board with the largest firm size, Market-to-
Book, and ROA values5
                                                 
5 Analyses were also ran with average Firm Size, Market-to-Book, and ROA, and 
the results were not significantly different from the maximum values for each 
director.  
. These control variables were chosen for the potential 
impact on a director’s ability to obtain subsequent board appointments. However, 
   99 
in my analysis, only director age and firm size were consistently related to the 
outcomes of interest—likelihood of joining a new board, a Fortune 100 board, 
and exiting from a current board.  
 Director age may represent a number of factors that lead to a decrease in 
the likelihood of joining new boards, including Fortune 100 boards, and an 
increase in the likelihood of departing from a current board. In particular, director 
age is positively correlated with the likelihood that an individual will be retiring 
from the corporate world, in which case he or she will not be taking on any 
further board seats and retiring from any current positions. Relatedly, director age 
and its relationship to these board outcomes may reflect the mandatory retirement 
of some corporate boards for their directors. In recent decades, there has been an 
increasing tendency for firms to adopt mandatory retirement ages for directors on 
the board (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). These types of corporate governance policies 
are intend to ensure good corporate governance and intensify vigilance from 
corporate directors (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). In this instance, the mandatory 
retirement policies may be reflected in the significant impact director age has on 
director mobility.  
Similarly, director age may reflect the deterioration of the human and 
social capital of a potential director (Lester et al., 2008). Lester and colleagues 
suggest that directors, in their case former government officials, experience 
deterioration in their human and social capital over time. At a more general level, 
Schultz (1961: 13) provides that “human capital, like other forms of reproducible 
capital, depreciates, becomes obsolete, and entails maintenance.” In this case, 
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increased age may represent “all factors that reduce earning capacity with the 
passage of time such as obsolescence of acquired training, forgetfulness and 
decline of psycho-physiological powers as well as increased preference for leisure 
in old age” (Moreh, 1973: 279).  
The findings related to firm size are not surprising given the signal that 
serving on a board of large firm sends. However, I find little support for the 
impact of firm performance. This non-finding is surprising given past research 
that considers board performance and outside director appointments. For example, 
Gupta and colleagues (2008) finds evidence of a meritocracy view of the market 
for outside directorships in which executives from superior performing firms are 
rewarded with higher quality board seats. Ferris and colleagues (2003) also find 
the past performance of firms for which a director serves directly relates to the 
subsequent number of directorships he or she possesses. 
The non-finding also may reflect the time lag between firm performance 
and the response from the market for corporate directors. For example, Yermack 
(2004) finds that company performance impacts an outside director’s subsequent 
attainment of new outside appointments. In this case, the Yermack suggest, “that 
the market for directors’ services takes time to assess and assimilate the 
monitoring ability of newly appointed directors” (2004: 2303). Therefore, the 
performance effects of Market-to-Book and ROA from a director’s appointments 
may take more than one time period to affect a director’s likelihood of joining 
new, and possibly more prestigious, boards.  
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Main Effect Hypotheses 
My main effect hypotheses offer an examination of several human and 
social capital indicators—educational level, business expertise, director 
experience, and access to structural holes—and their relationship to the likelihood 
of joining a new board, a Fortune 100 board, and exiting a current board. Event 
history analysis was used to test these hypotheses. Table 8 offers a summary of 
the results from the testing of my hypotheses.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Educational level was consistently insignificant in each of the models 
examining its main effect on the board appointment outcomes of interest. This 
non-finding is surprising given the connection between educational affiliation and 
attainment and the investment in human capital that it represents (Schultz, 1961; 
Becker, 1964). Furthermore, a positive relationship between educational 
affiliation and attainment and board appointments was expected because of the 
signal that educational affiliation and attainment can send to a market. In this 
regard, education serves as a signal of intellectual ability on the labor market for 
directors (Spence, 1973, 1974). Additionally, education also carries status, and as 
such, a potential director may provide prestige to the hiring firm through his or 
her educational affiliation (D'Aveni, 1990).  
However, despite these factors, education may not be a factor in this 
particular sample because of my focus on individuals that are currently directors 
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and their mobility. These results may have been different if the focus was on how 
individuals receive their very first outside appointment on a board. In this case, a 
director’s educational affiliation and attainment may be a critical signal that does 
enable them to obtain the first appointment; however, after the individual has 
gained access to the market for corporate directors, the role of educational 
affiliation and attainment may substantially decline.  
While I find little support for the impact of educational affiliation and 
attainment on director mobility, my results provide consistent evidence for the 
impact of business expertise in predicting the likelihood of a director joining a 
new board. In this regard, these results support previous research which suggests 
that expertise in the management of other for-profit businesses is a highly sought 
after commodity on the market for corporate directors (Alibrandi, 1985; Hermalin 
& Weisbach, 1988; Vance, 1968).  
These results are, in general, in line with Fahlenbrach Low, and Stulz’s 
(2010) findings that CEOs are more likely to sit on prestigious boards of large 
established firms. However, I did not find that directors that are business experts 
are more likely join Fortune 100 boards. This non-result may be, in part, due to 
the fact that the business expert category of directors included both current and 
former executives. Examining only those directors currently serving as active 
executives may have provided markedly different results in terms of the 
relationship between business expertise and the attainment of more prestigious 
appointments. Similarly, my results did not indicate that business experts are any 
less likely to exit a current board. However, this finding, and my other finds in 
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terms of director exit, may speak to the high level of mobility a director 
experiences as he or she moves on and off of boards fairly frequently.  
 My analysis also suggests no significant impact of director experience, 
measured as years serving as a corporate director and the cumulative number of 
directorships, on the board appointment outcomes. Research suggests that 
experience serving on other corporate boards may provide a critical signal to a 
director’s ability to perform his or her board duties. The years of experience and 
the cumulative number of different experiences expose directors to a variety of 
strategic knowledge and perspectives (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1971). In 
this regard, previous experience serving on a board and the cumulative number of 
appointments may indicate that the potential director has the individual-level 
capabilities necessary to evaluate strategic decision making and provide advice 
and counsel to the executives of the firm (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). 
Similarly, Davis’ (1993) finds that directors sitting on more boards are more 
likely to be selected for subsequent appointments.  
 One particular reason for the non-finding of director experience may be 
due to its relationship with director age (Mincer & Jovanovic, 1981). Director 
experience may be similarly reflective of a director’s current career stage with 
those individuals with higher levels of director experience preparing to retire and 
taking on less board seats and exiting any current seats. In this instance, director 
experience may in fact reflect a curvilinear or diminishing returns relationship in 
which director experience leads to a higher likelihood of appointments to a certain 
degree at which point the impact of director experience begins to decline.  
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Relatedly, the non-finding of cumulative number of board appointments 
may suggest that it is not simply the accumulation of directorships that matter, but 
rather ties that these board seats constitute. Thus, rather than finding a significant 
relationship between cumulative number of directorship and the board 
appointment outcomes, I find that access to structural holes is an important factor 
in director selection and overall mobility.  
 In support of this perspective, the indicator for access to structural holes, 
Effective Network Size, provides fairly consistent results across the dependent 
variables of interest. As previously suggested, a director’s social capital directly 
affects his or her ability to provide access to critical resources to the board (Kim, 
2007; Kim & Cannella, 2008) and represents opportunities for firms to create 
linkages to new resources and external contingencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Thus, those individuals that have greater access to structural holes should be more 
likely to join new boards.  
However, greater access to structural holes not only makes the individual 
more attractive on the market but may also inherently provide opportunities for 
future board appointments (Useem, 1984; Westphal & Milton, 2000). For 
example, from the hiring-board perspective, Bazerman and Schoorman (1983: 
212) suggest that “the cost of an optimal search often will lead to making the 
choice within the bounds of existing social networks.” In this regard, the directors 
with higher levels of social capital, in this case greater access to structural holes, 
may be more likely to join new boards and join more prestigious boards. 
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While in this study I examined a director access to structural holes as an 
indicators of social capital, previous research also considers network centrality to 
be a major indicator of social capital (Borgatti et al., 1998). For example, Davis 
(1993) posits and finds that network centrality is major driver of the number of 
boards a director joins. From this perspective, those directors that hold centralized 
network positions (i.e., “they have the most ties to other actors in the network” 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994: 178) are more likely to represent opportunities for 
firms to acquire linkages to new resources and external contingencies (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Network centrality is also a form of social capital that provides 
“abundant access to the information that flows through the network” (Davis, 
1991: 592). Furthermore, network centrality from director interlocks may be seen 
as a resource itself for a firm as “greater centrality in interlock networks implies a 
greater capacity to coordinate actions and define situations” (Mariolois & Jones, 
1982: 573). Following this logic, I reran my analysis using a logged eigenvector 
measure of centrality rather than the access to structural holes indicator 
(Bonacich, 1972). The eigenvector measure of centrality captures the degree to 
which an individual is connected to other well-connected individuals (Borgatti, 
2005; Borgatti et al., 1998). My results for this indicator closely mirrored the 
results obtained from the access to structural holes measure with the centrality 
measure positively relating to each of my director mobility variables.   
Moderating Hypotheses 
While the specific focus of this study is on the impact of human and social 
capital indicators on a number of director mobility outcomes, I also considered a 
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number of individual and contextual-variables that may moderate these main-
effect relationships. In particular, I examined the moderating effect of gender, 
exiting a current board seat in the previous time period, sitting on a board that 
experienced a restatement, and the environmental dynamism the director faces at 
his or her current boards appointments.  
In hypothesis 4, I suggest that directors with higher levels of education, 
business expertise, director experience, and access to structural holes who are 
female should be more likely to join new boards and more likely to join Fortune 
100 boards. These directors should also be less likely to exit a current board. 
These hypotheses build upon the research that suggests female directors provide a 
number of unique resources to a board (Hillman et al., 2007; Terjesen, Sealy, & 
Singh, 2009). Additionally, research on female representation suggests that 
female directors often hold advanced degrees, a strong business track record, and 
possess specialized knowledge and information (Burke, 1997b; Burke & Leblanc, 
2008; Peterson & Philpot, 2007). Thus, I hypothesized that the impact of human 
and social capital on board selection would be higher for female directors.  
However, each of the models examining the impact of gender offers 
evidence that there is neither a direct nor a moderating effect of gender on the 
board appointment outcomes. These results may be more in line with recent work 
on director selection focused on the ingratiatory practices that lead to board 
appointments. For example, Westphal and Stern (2006; 2007) find the ingratiatory 
behavior may be another way that directors receive new appointments. Those top 
managers that use impression management tactics, in this case ingratiation, 
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toward their CEO are more likely to receive subsequent board appointments at 
other firms where their CEO serves and at boards connected to the CEO through 
his or her directorate network. These ingratiatory tactics may substitute to some 
degree for an individual’s elite background or demographic majority status 
(Westphal & Stern, 2006). However, minorities required greatly levels of 
ingratiatory behavior to receive future appointments and were punished more for 
engaging in monitoring and control. Following this logic, female directors may be 
required to possess even higher levels of human and social capital in order to 
obtain new appointments. Thus, the moderating effect of gender on human and 
social capital and board appointment outcomes may be non-existence or masked 
by the fact that these individuals require higher levels to meet a “minimum 
threshold” to obtain subsequent appointments relative to their male counterparts.  
Hypothesis 5 proposes that a director’s previous exit from a current board 
will positively moderate the relationship between director education, expertise, 
experience and access to structural holes and subsequent board appointments. In 
this regard, the main effect of a director’s exit in the previous period did, in fact, 
increase the likelihood of joining a new board. This finding may suggest that 
directors are cognizant of the perceived under-utilization of human and social 
capital on the market for corporate directors and thus may attempt to quickly 
acquire new appointments when exiting a current appointment. Conversely, the 
exit from one board may “free up” the director to serve on other boards. Thus, 
exiting a current board may actually increase a director’s overall board mobility.  
   108 
Similarly, because of the secondary-nature of my data, a number of 
unexplored factors may influence the decision to exit a board that may have little 
to do with the director’s overall stock of human and social capital and his or her 
attractiveness as a candidate for a board appointment. In any regard, the positive 
relationship between a director’s previous exit from a board and the likelihood of 
joining a new board, again, may suggest that directors may be extremely mobile 
on the market for corporate directors. In examining the moderating effect of a 
director’s previous departures, business experts seem to benefit the least from 
exiting a current board seat. Here again, because their expertise is tied up in their 
experiences in decision-making in other firms and boards the departure from a 
current board position may send a stronger signal to market relative to a support 
specialist or community influential who departures from a similar board.  
For hypothesis 6, I examined the moderating impact of sitting a board that 
has experienced a restatement on the relationship between human and social 
capital and director mobility. Previous research suggests that directors serving on 
boards that experience ethical violations, including restatements, are likely to 
experience sanctions on the market for corporate directors (Arthaud-Day et al., 
2006; Srinivasan, 2005). However, as indicated in Table 3, the main effect of 
sitting a board that has experienced a restatement and the board appointment 
outcomes is negligible in this study. In examining the moderating effect of this 
variable, the restatement indicator only moderated the relationship between 
educational prestige and the board appointment outcomes. One possible 
explanation for this non-finding of the moderating impact of a restatement event 
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may be that directors experience only limited sanctions across their different 
board seats.  
An alternative explanation for these non-findings may due in part to the 
relative infrequency of reported fraudulent behavior and financial reporting fraud. 
In this case, previous studies have examined the consequence of restatements 
using a matched-sample approach that enables the researchers to control for the 
low relative frequency of restatements. Additionally, previous studies have taken 
the firm or board as their level of analysis. In this case, it may be easier to 
examine the sanctions that are exposed on a director at the specific firm 
experiencing the restatement rather than focusing on the overall impact a 
restatement has on the mobility of an individual director.  
Finally, hypothesis 7 suggests that a director with higher levels of 
education, business expertise, director experience, and access to structural holes is 
less likely to join new boards when the director is currently sitting on boards 
facing greater levels of environmental dynamism. Overall, the results partially 
support this perspective. These findings may suggest that directors currently 
sitting on boards in more dynamic environments face greater demands from these 
boards and as such avoid becoming overboarded (e.g., Core et al., 1999; Fich & 
Shivdasani, 2006; Harris & Shimizu, 2004). 
 
Limitations 
As with all research, my findings are subject to several potential 
limitations that must be considering when interpreting my results. In particular, in 
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considering these results, the sampling frame is an important factor to consider. 
This sample consisted of directors currently serving on S&P 500 boards. This 
sampling frame was chosen impart to examine and compare a variety of different 
directors (e.g., directors with business expertise relative to those that possess 
support specialist expertise) rather than focusing specifically on business 
executives that enter and exit the market for corporate directors. However, the 
results may have been considerably different with a sampling frame of potential 
directors who were not currently sitting on corporate board.  
Second, because of the focus on corporate boards in the U.S., the findings 
from this study may not be generalized to directors serving exclusively on private 
and non-profit board or boards outside of the U.S. In particular, the selection 
criteria and overall market for different types of directors may be significantly 
different from corporate directors. In related point, director selection in other 
countries may not match the institutional forces and governance procedures that 
dictate the selection process in the U.S., and, thus, the results of this study may 
not be generalizable to markets for corporate directors outside in other countries.  
Third, because of my reliance on secondary data, this study does not 
hypothesize or examine any of the micro-process that underlies a director’s 
willingness and motivation to accept a board appointment. As suggested below in 
the future research section, examining why directors accept board seats remains 
an underdeveloped area of the director selection research. Through my 
methodological approach, however, this study captures only those instances in 
which a director has accepted a board appointment. Thus, this test of director 
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mobility does not reflect a director’s underlying motivations for selecting one 
board appointment over another or simply declining a board appointment outright. 
Furthermore, Westphal and Stern’s (e.g., Stern & Westphal, 2010; Westphal & 
Stern, 2006, 2007) recent work on ingratiatory behavior and subsequent director 
appointments suggests that impression management tactics may be a key driver in 
obtain subsequent board appointments. However, to gauge this sort of micro 
process, research utilizing primary data is essential. Thus, these findings suggest 
that a multi-method approach combining primary and secondary research is 
necessary to fully examine the director selection process and the resulting board 
appointment outcome.  
Fourth, while this study offers one of the few attempts to examine the 
individual-determinants of director mobility, the firm-level factors of the selecting 
board is critical to more fully understanding the complex process of director 
selection. This study only captures one part of what is in reality a two-side 
matching problem in which firms attempt to match with potential directors to 
produce the board appointment outcome.  
Finally, while the BoardEx database represents a unique source to 
examine the underlying dimensions of human and social capital, there is the 
possibility of missing or incomplete data for any particular director. I have 
attempted to alleviate this concern by checking the information provided by 
BoardEx with other sources including proxy statements, online executive 
biographers, and information on corporate websites.  
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Future Research Directions 
The theorizing and results of this study suggest a number of promising 
avenues for future research. First, this study has attempted to offer a number of 
insights into the antecedents to an individual to joining a new board. However, 
this study is unable to answer one of the fundamental questions—Why do certain 
individuals accept board appointments? As Finkelstein and Colleagues (2009: 
253) suggest, “the process of being offered, and accepting, a board appointment is 
still not well understood.” This question is vitally important because, as Bacon 
and Brown (1975: 56) suggest, “to serve as an outside director is to play a game 
that is not worth the candle.” And, yet individuals are still willing to step up and 
serve in a capacity that can be professionally demanding and time consuming and 
subjects the individual to potential legal costs of not fulfilling shareholder 
obligations. 
In their study of boards of directors, Lorsch and MacIver (1989) delve into 
the questions of why individuals refuse and accept board appointments (See also 
Bacon & Brown, 1975). The authors report the following reasons (in order of 
importance) for declining an offer to join a board: (1) “Lack of time;” (2) 
“Meeting conflicts,” (3) “Conflict of interest,” (4) “Could not play useful role,” 
(5) “No interest in firm’s industry,” (6) “Uncertainty about firm’s future,” and (7) 
“Personal liability.” The authors also provide anecdotal evidence of director 
rationale for turning declining an offer. As one director indicated, “you have so 
little time that you really can’t take on more than two if you want to do the job 
properly” (24). Another director provided, “When I evaluate an offer to join a 
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board, first I determine whether…there is a conflict of interest. Next I have to find 
out whether there will be a conflict of days” (25).  
Similarly, Lorsch and MacIver report that directors accept offers to join  
boards because of: (1) “Quality of top management,” (2) “Opportunity to learn,” 
(3) “Challenge as director,” (4) “Prestige of the firm,” (5) “Potential growth of the 
firm,” (6) “Opportunity to work with board members,” (7) “Personal prestige,” (8) 
“Compensation,” (9) “Major stock ownership.” In support of this perspective, one 
director states, “Serving on a board is a way to see how somebody else is doing 
the same thing you’re doing. I usually look at the company to see if they are a 
strong, growing firm, but I also look at the senior people to see if they’re 
interesting and if they’ll be involved in interesting problems” (27).  
 Despite Lorsch and MacIver’s earlier findings, research on director 
selection has yet to develop theoretical and empirical support for an individual’s 
motivation to serve as an outside director or why certain individuals are more or 
less likely to accept an invitation to join a board. Thus, attempting to address this 
fundamental question may offer a number of new directions for future research. 
For example, how do potential directors cognitively evaluate a board appointment 
opportunity? What individual-level motives provide the impetus for accepting a 
board seat? How do an individual’s career motives influence his or her 
willingness to serve on corporate board? Does sitting on a board have the desired 
effect on the career? What drives a director’s willingness to sit on less established 
boards (e.g., boards of IPOs)? How do firms use incentives to entice individuals 
to serve on their boards?  
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Second, future research may look to examining the director selection 
process as a two-sided matching problem that includes considerations of the 
supply and demand sides operating on the market for corporate directors. As 
previously mentioned, this study focuses specifically on the individual-level 
drivers of subsequent board appointments; however, the selection and appoint of 
director selection occurs when the needs of a firm and desires of the potential 
director align. In other words, a match occurs when a firm has a need for a 
potential director and a director that fulfills those needs sees that the benefits of 
serving on the board outweigh the costs. Because of the inherent difficulties of 
empirically capturing the complexities of a two-sided matching process, previous 
research has often focused either on the supply or demand characteristics of the 
process while neglecting the other. Future research must take into consideration 
the dual-sided nature of this matching problem and consider the supply and 
demand conditions simultaneously. This type of endeavor will require the 
employment of more sophisticated theorizing and methodological approaches to 
represent the selection process.  
Third, future research may focus on director exit as a specific board 
outcome. While this study attempts to examine director exit as a major mobility 
outcome, few studies have considered director turnover and exit as a main 
outcome of interest. This lack of research on director exit and turnover is 
surprising given the impact that it can have on important board outcomes. As a 
director steps down, the board may be losing valuable human and social capital 
that directly influenced board performance.  
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This lack of research also is surprising given the related literature on 
executive turnover and exit (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). In 
this regard, upper echelons researchers have developed a fairly well informed 
understanding of both the antecedents and consequences of executive turnover. 
However, relative to the executive turnover literature, board researchers have yet 
to delve into similar questions to the same degree. Thus, understanding why a 
director decides to exit a board, how the board prepares and plans for this event, 
and how the turnover affects board performance are questions that remain 
unanswered in the literature.  
Fourth, research may begin considering the impact of different governance 
mechanisms on the director selection process. Boards of directors represent only 
one of several governance mechanisms in place to serve the interest of 
shareholder (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). While 
governance research recognizes a number of different governance mechanisms, 
including ownership concentration, executive leadership structure, and the market 
for corporate control, director selection research often considers the selection 
process outside of the influence of these other governance mechanisms. However, 
research suggests that these different governance mechanisms may interact in 
ways that may complement (Kosnik, 1987; Tosi, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 1997) or 
substitute (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Rediker & Seth, 1995) for one another. In either 
case, the other governance mechanisms currently in place may directly influence 
the director selection process and, in turn, who is selected to serve on board. This 
interaction of different governance mechanisms suggests that research considering 
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director selection should consider how other governance influence the director 
selection process.  
  Finally, another possible extension may be to simultaneously consider 
current top management team and board members when examining director 
selection. In this regard, the director selection choice may be based on how the 
potential director’s skills, knowledge, and other resources complement those of 
executives of the top management team, and not just the other members of the 
board. In this case, do the backgrounds of the top management team members 
influence who is selected to the board? Do top management team homogeneity 
and heterogeneity reflect similarly on the composition of the board of directors? 
How might top management team behavioral integration (Hambrick, 1994) 
influence the type of individuals selected for a board?  
 
Conclusion 
This study focused on the mobility of current directors as they enter and 
exit different boards. Using human and social capital theories, I develop 
individual-level predictions on the likelihood of joining a new board, a prestigious 
board, and exiting a current board. From this study, I have attempted to offer a 
complementary perspective of the director selection process by developing an 
individual-level perspective of board appointments. 
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Table 1 







Perspective of  
Human and Social Capital 
Measure of  




Human Capital Empirical 
Examine the relationship 
between director incentives of 
board-level human capital on 
acquiring firm shareholders’ 
returns in the context of CEO 
ownership. 
 
Human capital is measured through their 
measure of Outside board member target 
industry experience, which captures “the 
number of outside directors who served as 
a manager or board member of a firm in 
the same industry as the acquisition target 
[…] within five years prior to the focal 
acquisition announcement date” (265). 
Kim (2007) Social Capital Empirical 
Examines the relationship 
between outside director’s 
social capital and firm value. 
Social capital of outside directors is 
measured as “the degree to which outside 
board members have outside contacts 
within an institutional environment” 
(1170). 
Keys and Li 
(2005) Human Capital Empirical 
Examine the relationship 
between professional director’s 
human capital and the 
probability of receiving a new 
appointment after their firm is 
acquired. 
Do not directly measure human capital. 
Suggest that professional directors have 
more transferable human capital.  
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Perspective of  
Human and Social Capital 
Measure of  
















Examine the role of social capital 
in new director selection, board 




Conceptually, the authors 
suggest that director social 
capital can be divided into 
internal and external social 
capital. 
Singh (2007) Human and Social 
Capital 
Empirical Considers the human and social 
capital of ethnic minority 
directors, and the resources these 
directors bring to a firm. 
Human capital is measured as 
directorship type 
(insider/outsider), tenure, and 
experience. Social capital is 
measured as the reported ties to 
other sources of influence. 
Lester et al. 
(2008) 
Human and Social 
Capital 
Empirical Examine the role of depth, 
breadth, and deterioration of 
human and social in determining 
the likelihood of former 
government officials receiving 
board appointments. 
Human and social capital were 
measure simultaneously. Human 
and social capital depth is 
measured as tenure in 
government services. Human 
and social capital breadth is 
measured based on the job 
complexity and prestige of an 
individual’s last gov. position. 
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Perspective of  
Human and Social Capital 
Measure of  
Human and Social Capital 
Nicholson et al 
(2004) Social Capital Empirical 
Examine a board’s social 
capital created from 
interlocking directorates  
Social capital is measured using network 
measures. In particular, the authors use the 
distance between participants in the network. 
Harris and 
Helfat (2007) Social Capital Conceptual 
At the board-level, 
consider the social network 
within the board itself.  
Conceptually suggests that the ties between 
individual directors within a board should be 
considered.  
Stevenson and 
Radin (2009) Social Capital Empirical 
Examine the role of social 
ties in determining director 
influence on a focal board. 
Directors were asked “How often do you talk 
to these people [other directors] about 





Social Capital Conceptual 
Posit that board-level 
human and social capital 
(i.e. Board Capital) affects 
a board’s ability to perform 
monitoring and resource 
board provision functions.  
Conceptualize board capital as the 
combination of “human capital (experience, 
expertise, reputation) and relational capital 
(network of ties to other firms and external 




Social Capital Empirical 
Examines how board 
capital breadth and depth 
affect strategic change.  
Board capital breadth is measured using a 
heterogeneity index. Board capital depth is 
measured as the linkages to and expertise in 
industry. 
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Table 2 
Means and Correlations 
  Mean S.D. 1  2  3  4  5  
1. Board Entry   0.06   0.23 1          
2. Fortune 100 Entry   0.02   0.14 0.61 *** 1        
3. Board Exit   0.14   0.35 0.08 *** 0.04 *** 1      
4. Director Age  64.32   7.81 -0.13 *** -0.08 *** 0.05 *** 1    
5. Max ROA   4.74  11.94 0.03 * 0.03 *** 0.06 *** -0.08 *** 1  
6. Max Market-to-Book   0.05   0.07 0.05 *** 0.05 *** 0.11 *** -0.13 *** 0.30 *** 
7. Max Firm Size   2.90   1.82 0.12 *** 0.09 *** 0.25 *** -0.21 *** 0.23 *** 
8. Advanced Degree   0.31   0.46 -0.01  -0.01  -0.00  0.01  0.00  
9. Educational Prestige   0.52   0.50 0.00  0.01  0.02  -0.00  0.04 *** 
10. Business Expert   0.57   0.49 0.04 *** 0.02 † 0.01  -0.02 † -0.00  
11. Community Influential   0.22   0.41 -0.02 † -0.00  0.01  -0.01  0.00  
12. Support Specialist   0.21   0.41 -0.03 * -0.02 † -0.02  0.03 * 0.00  
13. Director Experience  14.40   7.67 -0.09 *** -0.04 *** 0.04 *** 0.52 *** -0.02  
14. Cumul. Directorships    2.26   1.56 0.06 *** 0.05 *** 0.25 *** 0.17 *** 0.17 *** 
15. Effective Network Size   12.50  13.93 0.21 *** 0.14 *** 0.25 *** -0.14 *** 0.21 *** 
16. Gender    0.12   0.33 -0.00  -0.01  0.01  -0.17 *** 0.04 *** 
17. Previous Board Exit   0.14   0.35 0.08 *** 0.08 *** 0.04 *** 0.09 *** 0.06 *** 
18. Restatement   0.10   0.30 0.02 † 0.01  0.12 *** 0.01  0.04 *** 
19. Avg. Dynamism   0.00   0.41 0.07 *** 0.05 *** 0.20 *** -0.28 *** 0.20 *** 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
 
  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  
6. Max Market-to-Book 1              
7. Max Firm Size 0.44 *** 1            
8. Advanced Degree -0.02  0.02 † 1          
9. Educational Prestige 0.07 *** 0.06 *** 0.03 * 1        
10. Business Expert 0.01  -0.01  -0.33 *** -0.06 *** 1      
11. Community Influential 0.01  0.02  0.34 *** 0.00  -0.61 *** 1    
12. Support Specialist -0.02 † -0.01  0.05 *** 0.07 *** -0.60 *** -0.27 *** 1  
13. Director Experience -0.07 *** -0.13 *** 0.02  0.07 *** -0.11 *** 0.00  0.13 *** 
14. Cumul. Directorships  0.25 *** 0.39 *** 0.01  0.07 *** -0.01  0.03 * -0.02 † 
15. Effective Network Size  0.36 *** 0.55 *** -0.01  0.04 *** 0.03 * 0.02 † -0.06 *** 
16. Gender  0.04 *** 0.06 *** 0.09 *** -0.03 * -0.18 *** 0.20 *** 0.01  
17. Previous Board Exit 0.11 *** 0.25 *** -0.00  0.01  0.01  -0.00  -0.01  
18. Restatement 0.08 *** 0.23 *** -0.01  0.00  -0.02  0.01  0.02  
19. Avg. Dynamism 0.40 *** 0.80 *** 0.00  0.05 *** -0.02 † -0.01  0.04 *** 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
 
  13  14  15  16  17  18  
13. Director Experience 1            
14. Cumul. Directorships  0.24 *** 1          
15. Effective Network Size  -0.07 *** 0.56 *** 1        
16. Gender  -0.07 *** 0.08 *** 0.02  1      
17. Previous Board Exit 0.07 *** 0.27 *** 0.16 *** 0.01  1    
18. Restatement 0.06 *** 0.25 *** 0.18 *** 0.02  0.07 *** 1  
19. Avg. Dynamism -0.19 *** 0.18 *** 0.38 *** 0.05 *** 0.20 *** 0.17 *** 
              
 
N=7360; † p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 




Event History Analysis: Main effects 
 


















Director Age 0.951 0.01 *** 0.943 0.01 *** 1.059 0.01 *** 1.059 0.01 *** 
Max ROA 1.087 0.83  0.401 0.21 † 0.825 0.63  2.700 1.44 † 
Max Market-to-Book 0.998 0.00  0.996 0.00  1.000 0.00  1.001 0.00  
Max Firm Size 1.322 0.05 *** 1.225 0.07 *** 0.753 0.03 *** 0.819 0.04 *** 
Advanced Degree    0.940 0.12     1.057 0.13  
Educational Prestige    1.104 0.12     0.901 0.09  
Business Expert    1.426 0.25 *    0.724 0.12 * 
Support Specialist    1.127 0.22     0.896 0.17  
Director Experience    0.987 0.01     1.016 0.01 † 
Cumulative Directorships    0.787 0.04 ***   1.271 0.06 *** 
Effective Network Size    1.051 0.01 ***   0.952 0.00 *** 
Gender     0.822 0.13     1.230 0.19  
Previous Board Exit    2.196 0.27 ***   0.475 0.05 *** 
Restatement    1.140 0.18     0.906 0.13  
Avg. Dynamism    0.483 0.13 **    1.910 0.48 * 
             
Model Pseudo  
Log-Likelihood -2592.51  -2488.28  1592.31  1697.63  
Model Chi-Square 105.58 *** 361.76 *** 164.96 *** 475.23 *** 
Wald Chi-Square 105.58 *** 192.94 *** 164.96 *** 230.05 *** 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
 


















Director Age 0.948 0.01 *** 0.932 0.01 *** 1.044 0.01 *** 1.049 0.01 *** 
Max ROA 4.252 4.95  1.249 1.63  2.171 1.33  0.465 0.21 † 
Max Market-to-Book 1.001 0.00  1.001 0.00  1.000 0.00  0.998 0.00  
Max Firm Size 1.456 0.10 *** 1.371 0.13 ** 1.561 0.03 *** 1.143 0.03 *** 
Advanced Degree    0.887 0.18     1.009 0.07  
Educational Prestige    1.292 0.22     0.990 0.06  
Business Expert    1.197 0.31     1.019 0.09  
Support Specialist    0.968 0.28     0.902 0.09  
Director Experience    1.002 0.01     0.999 0.00  
Cumulative Directorships    0.782 0.07 **    1.208 0.03 *** 
Effective Network Size    1.047 0.01 ***    1.010 0.00 *** 
Gender     0.608 0.18 †    1.114 0.11  
Previous Board Exit    2.926 0.61 ***    0.641 0.05 *** 
Restatement    0.964 0.25     1.090 0.10  
Avg. Dynamism    0.380 0.18 *    23.281 10.79 *** 
             
Model Pseudo  
Log-Likelihood -1000.89  -955.82  -6559.66  -6403.01  
Model Chi-Square 64.45 *** 241.38 *** 520.04 *** 444.66 *** 
Wald Chi-Square 64.45 *** 108.36 *** 520.04 *** 220.36 *** 
         
† p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
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Table 4 
Event History Analysis Moderator: Gender 


















Director Age 0.942 0.01 *** 1.060 0.01 *** 0.930 0.01 *** 1.049 0.01 *** 
Max ROA 0.415 0.22  2.584 1.41 † 1.290 1.72  0.476 0.22  
Max Market-to-Book 0.997 0.00  1.001 0.00  1.001 0.00  0.998 0.00  
Max Firm Size 1.221 0.07 ** 0.821 0.04 *** 1.371 0.13 ** 1.138 0.03 *** 
Advanced Degree 0.943 0.13  1.057 0.14  0.893 0.19  0.977 0.07  
Educational Prestige 1.060 0.12  0.937 0.10  1.173 0.21  0.969 0.07  
Business Expert 1.462 0.27 * 0.702 0.12 * 1.221 0.33  0.964 0.09  
Support Specialist 1.162 0.24  0.866 0.17  0.970 0.29  0.854 0.09  
Director Experience 0.982 0.01 † 1.021 0.01 * 0.999 0.01  0.998 0.01  
Cumulative Directorships  0.808 0.05 *** 1.242 0.07 *** 0.803 0.07 * 1.207 0.03 *** 
Effective Network Size  1.050 0.01 *** 0.953 0.00 *** 1.045 0.01 *** 1.009 0.00 *** 
Gender  0.818 0.54  1.222 0.76  0.346 0.40  0.963 0.20  
Previous Board Exit 2.168 0.27 *** 0.481 0.05 *** 2.859 0.61 *** 0.638 0.05 *** 
Restatement 1.140 0.19  0.902 0.13  0.982 0.26  1.090 0.10  
Avg. Dynamism 0.479 0.13 ** 1.928 0.49 ** 0.376 0.18 * 23.717 10.94 *** 
Gender X Adv. Degree 0.892 0.34  1.089 0.40  0.953 0.65  1.206 0.22  
Gender X Edu. Prestige 1.576 0.50  0.661 0.20  3.349 2.36 † 1.162 0.23  
Gender X Bus. Expert 0.985 0.57  1.068 0.59  0.919 0.74  1.179 0.25  
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 













Gender X Support Specialist 1.046 0.53  0.950 0.46  0.936 0.69  0.803 0.16  
Gender X Director Exp. 1.073 0.03 ** 0.938 0.02 * 1.082 0.06  1.012 0.02  
Gender X Cumul. Dir. 0.718 0.11 * 1.349 0.21 † 0.636 0.16 † 0.985 0.07  
Gender X Network Size  1.016 0.01  0.986 0.01  1.030 0.02  1.007 0.01  
             
Model Pseudo  
Log-Likelihood -2483.90  1701.31  -952.28  -6400.08  
Model Chi-Square 370.16 *** 474.12 *** 263.03 *** 548.22 *** 
Wald Chi-Square 9.36  8.890  6.95  9.71  
             
Note: The continuous variables composing the interaction term are mean-centered. † p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
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Table 5 
Event History Analysis Moderator: Previous Board Exit 


















Director Age 0.942 0.01 *** 1.061 0.01 *** 0.930 0.01 *** 1.049 0.01 *** 
Max ROA 0.428 0.24  2.545 1.43 † 1.679 2.26  0.476 0.22  
Max Market-to-Book 0.997 0.00  1.001 0.00  1.001 0.00  0.998 0.00  
Max Firm Size 1.214 0.07 ** 0.825 0.04 *** 1.358 0.13 ** 1.138 0.03 *** 
Advanced Degree 0.907 0.14  1.087 0.16  0.881 0.22  0.977 0.07  
Educational Prestige 1.030 0.12  0.958 0.11  1.180 0.23  0.969 0.07  
Business Expert 1.411 0.26 † 0.735 0.13 † 1.198 0.31  0.964 0.09  
Support Specialist 1.054 0.22  0.962 0.19  0.764 0.22  0.854 0.09  
Director Experience 0.982 0.01 † 1.020 0.01 * 1.002 0.01  0.998 0.01  
Cumulative Directorships  0.800 0.05 *** 1.260 0.07 *** 0.812 0.08 * 1.207 0.03 *** 
Effective Network Size  1.055 0.01 *** 0.948 0.00 *** 1.051 0.01 *** 1.009 0.00 *** 
Gender  0.814 0.13  1.248 0.19  0.600 0.18 † 0.963 0.20  
Previous Board Exit 3.145 1.10 ** 0.322 0.10 *** 7.576 3.39 *** 0.638 0.05 *** 
Restatement 1.145 0.19  0.900 0.13  0.962 0.25  1.090 0.10  
Avg. Dynamism 0.453 0.12 ** 2.041 0.52 ** 0.340 0.16 * 23.717 10.94 *** 
Exit X Adv. Degree 1.157 0.29  0.875 0.20  1.050 0.45  1.206 0.22  
Exit X Edu. Prestige 1.230 0.28  0.839 0.17  1.234 0.46  1.162 0.23  
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Table 5 (Continued) 
 


















Exit X Bus. Expert 0.718 0.24  1.397 0.42  0.379 0.16 * 1.179 0.25  
Exit X Support Specialist 0.630 0.23  1.590 0.53  0.344 0.17 * 0.803 0.16  
Exit X Director Exp. 1.014 0.02  0.988 0.02  1.000 0.03  1.012 0.02  
Exit X Cumul. Dir. 0.969 0.09  1.005 0.08  0.921 0.13  0.985 0.07  
Exit X Network Size  0.991 0.01  1.012 0.01  0.990 0.01  1.007 0.01  
             
Model Pseudo  
Log-Likelihood -2484.08  1701.68  -950.78  -6398.32  
Model Chi-Square 389.03 *** 508.71 *** 248.85 *** 456.54 *** 
Wald Chi-Square 9.84  11.160  16.09 * 9.25  
             
Note: The continuous variables composing the interaction term are mean-centered. † p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
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Table 6 
Event History Analysis Moderator: Restatement  


















Director Age 0.942 0.01 *** 1.060 0.01 *** 0.931 0.01 *** 1.049 0.01 *** 
Max ROA 0.404 0.21 † 2.680 1.44 † 1.315 1.69  0.482 0.22  
Max Market-to-Book 0.996 0.00  1.001 0.00  1.001 0.00  0.999 0.00  
Max Firm Size 1.228 0.07 *** 0.815 0.04 *** 1.366 0.13 ** 1.147 0.03 *** 
Advanced Degree 0.892 0.12  1.113 0.14  0.865 0.18  1.021 0.08  
Educational Prestige 1.176 0.13  0.841 0.09  1.459 0.26 * 0.918 0.06  
Business Expert 1.366 0.24 † 0.756 0.12 † 1.076 0.27  1.067 0.10  
Support Specialist 1.070 0.22  0.952 0.18  0.882 0.25  0.917 0.10  
Director Experience 0.986 0.01  1.016 0.01 † 1.002 0.01  1.003 0.01  
Cumulative Directorships  0.778 0.04 *** 1.278 0.07 *** 0.741 0.06 *** 1.220 0.03 *** 
Effective Network Size  1.054 0.01 *** 0.950 0.00 *** 1.056 0.01 *** 1.011 0.00 *** 
Gender  0.815 0.13  1.235 0.19  0.599 0.18 † 1.085 0.11  
Previous Board Exit 2.228 0.27 *** 0.468 0.05 *** 3.078 0.63 *** 0.639 0.05 *** 
Restatement 1.887 0.71 † 0.511 0.18 † 2.460 1.29 † 1.250 0.31  
Avg. Dynamism 0.456 0.12 ** 2.020 0.51 ** 0.344 0.16 * 22.92 10.60 *** 
Restate X Adv. Degree 1.742 0.62  0.606 0.20  1.670 0.90  0.947 0.18  
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Table 6 (Continued) 
 


















Restate X Edu. Prestige 0.589 0.18 † 1.781 0.50 * 0.366 0.19 * 1.430 0.24 * 
Restate X Bus. Expert 0.907 0.37  1.204 0.46  1.162 0.68  0.746 0.19  
Restate X Support Specialist 0.794 0.39  1.432 0.65  0.641 0.51  1.053 0.29  
Restate X Director Exp. 1.015 0.02  0.991 0.02  1.017 0.03  0.986 0.01  
Restate X Cumul. Dir. 1.039 0.12  0.995 0.11  1.315 0.26  0.967 0.06  
Restate X Network Size  0.977 0.01 * 1.017 0.01 † 0.936 0.02 *** 0.994 0.01  
             
Model Pseudo  
Log-Likelihood -2483.23  1701.96  -947.13  -6396.00  
Model Chi-Square 377.33 *** 509.26 *** 278.44 *** 498.82 *** 
Wald Chi-Square 13.99 † 12.80 † 18.27 * 15.91 * 
             
Note: The continuous variables composing the interaction term are mean-centered. † p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 




Event History Analysis Moderator: Environmental Dynamism 
 











Std. Err. Haz. Ratio 
Robust  
Std. Err. 
Director Age 0.942 0.01 *** 1.059 0.01 *** 0.931 0.01 *** 1.050 0.01 *** 
Max ROA 0.417 0.22  2.614 1.41 † 1.291 1.71  0.497 0.23  
Max Market-to-Book 0.997 0.00  1.001 0.00  1.001 0.00  0.998 0.00  
Max Firm Size 1.228 0.07 *** 0.816 0.04 *** 1.372 0.13 ** 1.135 0.03 *** 
Advanced Degree 0.942 0.13  1.058 0.14  0.921 0.19  0.617 0.16 † 
Educational Prestige 1.011 0.12  0.981 0.11  1.099 0.21  0.973 0.20  
Business Expert 1.306 0.23  0.788 0.13  0.951 0.25  1.181 0.18  
Support Specialist 1.093 0.23  0.917 0.18  0.849 0.27  0.891 0.12  
Director Experience 0.978 0.01 * 1.024 0.01 * 0.992 0.01  0.992 0.01  
Cumulative Directorships  0.846 0.05 ** 1.183 0.06 ** 0.790 0.07 * 1.302 0.04 *** 
Effective Network Size  1.067 0.01 *** 0.938 0.00 *** 1.065 0.01 *** 1.042 0.01 *** 
Gender  0.817 0.13  1.227 0.19  0.610 0.18 † 1.076 0.11  
Previous Board Exit 2.213 0.27 *** 0.472 0.05 *** 2.898 0.61 *** 0.632 0.05 *** 
Restatement 1.138 0.19  0.903 0.13  0.940 0.24  1.086 0.10  
Avg. Dynamism 0.113 0.08 ** 8.303 5.34 ** 0.165 0.21  16.392 15.22 ** 
Avg. Dyn. X Adv. Degree 1.072 0.43  0.924 0.36  0.952 0.62  9.953 12.11 † 
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Table 7 (Continued) 
 











Std. Err. Haz. Ratio 
Robust  
Std. Err. 
Avg. Dyn. X Edu. Prestige 1.914 0.70 † 0.530 0.18 † 2.841 1.85  1.170 1.09  
Avg. Dyn. X Bus. Expert 1.577 0.94  0.613 0.35  1.667 1.86  0.356 0.24  
Avg. Dyn. X Support Specialist 0.812 0.55  1.157 0.75  0.348 0.43  0.787 0.52  
Avg. Dyn. X Director Exp. 1.054 0.03 † 0.954 0.02 † 1.063 0.06  1.039 0.05  
Avg. Dyn. X Cumul. Dir. 0.679 0.11 * 1.415 0.23 * 1.047 0.30  0.709 0.10 * 
Avg. Dyn. X Network Size  0.931 0.02 *** 1.077 0.02 *** 0.915 0.03 * 0.860 0.04 ** 
             
Model Pseudo  
Log-Likelihood -2479.26  1706.66  -950.55  -6391.04  
Model Chi-Square 405.85 *** 515.97 *** 258.74 *** 506.34 *** 
Wald Chi-Square 19.780 ** 22.87 ** 15.09 * 20.26 ** 
             






Summary of Results 
 
Hypothesis Results 
Hypothesis 1a: Directors with higher levels of education will be 
more likely to join a new board.  
 
Not Supported 
Hypothesis 1b: Directors with business expertise will be more 
likely to join a new board relative to directors with community 
or support specialist expertise. 
 
Supported 
Hypothesis 1c: Directors with more director experience will be 
more likely to join a new board.  
 
Not Supported 
Hypothesis 1d: Directors with access to more structural holes 
will be more likely to join a new board. 
 
Supported 
Hypothesis 2a: Directors with higher levels of education will be 
more likely to join a more prestigious board.  
 
Not Supported 
Hypothesis 2b: Directors with business expertise will be more 
likely to join a more prestigious board relative to directors with 
community or support specialist expertise.  
 
Not Supported 
Hypothesis 2c: Directors with more director experience will be 
more likely to join a more prestigious board.  
 
Not Supported 
Hypothesis 2d: Directors with access to more structural holes 
will be more likely to join a more prestigious board.  
 
Supported 
Hypothesis 3a: Directors with higher levels of education will be 
more likely to exit a current board.  
 
Not Supported 
Hypothesis 3b: Directors with business expertise will be more 
likely to exit a current board relative to directors with 
community or support specialist expertise.  
  
Not Supported 
Hypothesis 3c: Directors with higher levels of director 







Table 8 (Continued) 
 
Hypothesis Results 
Hypothesis 3d: Directors with access to more structural holes 
will more likely to exit a current board. 
 
Not Supported 
Hypothesis 4: Gender will moderate the relationship between 
human and social capital and subsequent board appointments 
such that directors with higher levels of education, expertise, 
experience and access to structural holes that are female will be 
more likely to experience (a) an increased likelihood of joining a 
new board, (b) an increased likelihood of join a more prestigious 
board, and (c) an increased likelihood of exiting a current board. 
 
Not Supported 
Hypothesis 5: A director’s departure from a board will moderate 
the relationship between human and social capital and 
subsequent board appointments such that directors with higher 
levels of education, expertise, experience and access to 
structural holes who exit a board in the previous period will be 
more likely to experience (a) an increased likelihood of joining a 
new board, (b) an increased likelihood of join a more prestigious 
board, and (c) a decreased likelihood of exiting another board. 
 
Not Supported 
Hypothesis 6: A financial restatement on a current board will 
moderate the relationship between human and social capital and 
subsequent board appointments such that directors with higher 
levels of education, business expertise, director experience and 
access to structural holes will be more likely to experience (a) a 
decreased likelihood of joining a new board, (b) a decreased 
likelihood of join a more prestigious board, and (c) an increased 









Hypothesis 7: A director’s average dynamism from his/her other 
current board seats will moderate the relationship between 
human and social capital and subsequent board appointments 
such that directors with higher levels of education, business 
expertise, director experience and access to structural holes that 
serve in more dynamic environments will be more likely to 
experience (a) a decreased likelihood of joining a new board, (b) 
a decreased likelihood of join a more prestigious board, and (c) 
















APPENDIX A  
ELITE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
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ELITE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS a 
 
 
Amherst College  
Brown University  
Carleton College  
Columbia University  
Cornell University  
Dartmouth College  
Grinnell College  
Harvard University  
Haverford College  
Johns Hopkins University  
Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology  
New York University  
Northwestern University  




Princeton University  
Stanford University  
Swarthmore College  
United States Military Academy  
United States Naval Academy  
University of California, Berkeley  
University of California, Los 
Angeles  
University of Chicago  
University of Michigan  
University of Pennsylvania  
Wellesley College  
Wesleyan University  
Williams College 
Yale University  
 
a Adapted from Finkelstein (1992) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
